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Аннотация. Интересы играют ключевую роль во внешней политике того или иного 
государства, в том числе и в международных отношениях. В социальной среде на 
каждое действие или решение определенного актора влияют его интересы. Но прежде 
чем обладать какими-либо интересами, должен быть какой-то «драйвер», который 
заставляет или влияет на форму и степень интересов актора в отношении определенной 
области или набора объектов. В международных отношениях это то, что «водитель» 
придает идентичность. 
Предполагая, что социальные субъекты имеют, во-первых, личность, а затем у них есть 
интересы, можно было бы сказать, что исследование идентичности как подхода к 
внешней политике конкретной страны имеет большое значение для понимания и 
установления определенных значений конкретной политики или стратегии. 
Существуют различные теоретические объяснения международных отношений, 
которые способствуют различной степени важности для идентичности, в то время как 
лишь немногие из них ставят роль личности как существенную. Цель этого тезиса 
заключается в поддержке и укреплении значения самобытности в международных 
отношениях и в социальных науках в целом. 
В течение, по крайней мере, последних десяти лет происходили грандиозные дебаты на 
тему русской идентичности. В этих дебатах различных авторов анализировался 
главным образом статус российской идентичности, которая находится в кризисе 
вследствие советской истории или авторитарных тенденций ее элит, или другие 
мнения, например, Россия должна взять пример из других стран и так далее. Верно или 
нет, что российская идентичность была в кризисе или насколько глубока был этот 
кризис, - это одно и может быть полезно для предотвращения тех же ошибок или для 
улучшения определенных политик. Однако такой подход не анализирует решения, 
принятые в российской внешней политике в отношении идентичности. 
Другая проблема заключается в том, что радикальные решения в российской внешней 
политике в последние годы предоставляются в дискурсе «ревизионизма», 
«империализма» или в контексте личных амбиций Путина перестроить Советский 
Союз, и лишь немногие делают связь с Роль российской идентичности в целом и ее 
роль во внешней политике России. 
По существу, целью этого тезиса является различный подход к проблеме российской 
идентичности и российской внешней политики, который заключается в выявлении 
 2 
 
компонентов, формирующих российскую идентичность, и которые далее преследуются 
с влиянием на внутреннюю и внешнюю политику, с предположением, что существует 
Отсутствие достаточного количества исследований, которые в хронологическом 
анализе разрабатывают построение российской идентичности. 
Исследования доказывают и отстаивают важность идентичности в международных 
отношениях, анализируя построение российской идентичности в определенный период 
и признавая российские компоненты идентичности, ее динамику и влияние на 
российскую внешнюю политику также в узком политическом дискурсе с Западом. 
Ключевые слова: Кризис, дискурс, внешняя политика, идентичность, интересы, 
международные отношения, Россия, Запад 
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Abstract Interests are playing key role in foreign policy of particular state, thus in 
international relations as well. In social environment, every action or decision of certain actor 
is influenced by its interests. But before possession of any interests, there must be some kind 
of “driver” that is forcing or influencing the shape and extent of actor’s interests towards 
specific area or set of objects. In international relations is that “driver” accorded to identity.  
Assuming that social actors are having firstly identity and then they got interests, led one to 
acknowledge that research of identity as an approach to foreign policy of particular country is 
significant in understanding and establishing of certain meanings of specific policy or 
strategy. There are various theoretical explanations of international relations which are 
promoting different level of importance towards identity, while only few of them are placing 
identity’s role as essential. The intend of this thesis is to support and strengthen the 
importance of identity in international relations and in social sciences in general. 
During the period of at least last ten years there were tremendous debates on the topic of 
Russian identity. These debates of various authors were analyzing mainly status of Russia’s 
identity, which is in crisis as a consequence of Soviet history or authoritarian tendencies of its 
elites, or other opinions like Russia should take example from other countries and so on. 
Whether it is true or not that Russian identity was in crisis or how deep that crisis was, is the 
one thing and can be useful for prevention of same mistakes or to make improvements in 
particular policies. However, such approach is not analyzing decisions taken in Russian 
foreign policy with respect to identity.  
Another issue is that radical decisions in Russian foreign policy in the last years are accorded 
in the discourse of “revisionism”, “imperialism”, or in context of Putin’s personal ambitions 
to re-construct Soviet Union, and only few are making connection to the role of Russian 
identity in general and its role in Russia’s foreign policy particularly.  
Essentially, aim of this thesis is different approach towards the issue of Russian identity and 
Russian foreign policy which is to identify the components that are forming Russian identity 
and that are further pursued with influence on domestic and foreign policy, with assumption, 
that there is a lack of enough researches which are elaborating the construction of Russian 
identity in chronological analysis.  
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Research is proving and advocating the importance of identity in international relations by 
analyzing the construction of Russian identity in specific period and by recognizing Russian 
identity components, its dynamic and influence for Russian foreign policy also in narrow 
political discourse with the West. 
Keywords: crisis, discourse, foreign policy, identity, interests, international relations, 
Russia, West 
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Introduction 
     As every political decision is social phenomenon, it cannot be understood properly without 
making the research of the context in which it was created, that is society, social groups as 
well social actors which are creating their actions with reference to which they are identifying 
with. Simply said, social subjects are having firstly identity towards which they are further 
legitimizing their action while the examination of actor’s identity is beneficial for 
understanding the environment in which it was created and also to understand actor’s actions 
as well motives behind them. As every identity is specific in its elements or components 
which are creating it, each identity requires different approach to be analyzed and also 
different approach for the further interaction that is intended to have specific outcomes. For 
instance, one group simply cannot dishonor the specific values that are creating the identity of 
another group without expecting adequate response from group which feels itself dishonored. 
It doesn’t matter if that action was conscious or unconscious, response should be expected but 
what is more important, study of that group’s identity which is one making reference to can 
prevent unpredictable calculations. 
Purrpose of this thesis is to prove that identity is important element in IR and to estimate this 
issue and recent developments specifically in Russian identity context. By analyzing of 
Russian identity construction in 2010-2016 thesis is applying to prove that study of actor’s 
identity is important in order to understand his actions (foreign, domestic policy) as well 
motives behind them. Furthermore, analysis of actor’s identity helps to predict possible 
outcomes in meaning of costs or benefits from particular action or strategy with respect to 
him and also with respect to objects which are forming his identity. Nevertheless study of 
actor’s identity is beneficial also in calculations of possible trends and prospects in his 
domestic and foreign policy as well in his further interactions with international environment.  
Study of identity supports the development of explanatory understanding mainly in historical 
but also in sociological means, that is - what are or what were the reasons of behavior of 
certain state.  
Discourse on Russian identity over the last years is rather intensive, but not sufficient in 
analyzing and achieving of widely common opinion. Scholars are divided in different 
characteristics of elements that are influential in defining of Russian identity and also divided 
in perspectives that they are applying on the research and sources influential for the status of 
Russian identity. However, there is widely accepted opinion that there are attempts to create 
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new Russian identity, but its concept and exact characteristics are not certain or not widely 
accepted.  
One of the fundamental reasons for this problem lies also in fact that researches on Russian 
identity are in many cases performed out of official discourse on Russian identity and are 
arranged in the sort of “cogitations” that fits author’s various preferences like ideological, 
political or limitations and boundaries of identity theory. For instance, this means that several 
studies are oriented on Russian identity, but after all they are not applying research method 
from theories that are treating identity as important in international relations and also that 
which are having specific studies and concepts on identity and its role in global politics.  
Assuming the incoherence on the Russian identity discourse means also similar inconsistency 
in its role in foreign policy, or better say assumptions that Russian identity is weak for 
consistent foreign policy. Another problem in analyses of Russian identity, particularly in its 
role in foreign policy is the media’s framing of subjective opinion of any civic representative 
or random citizen in foreign policy and identity issues, what is further misused for the 
purposes of analysis of identity or foreign policy what is after all not very independent. Same 
is applicable in the researches on Russian identity provided with focus on another context of 
Russian policy from which is further analyzed assumption on Russian identity issues, while 
such studies lacks comprehensive identity context.  
Similar are studies undertaken mainly by politically motivated opposition with aim to 
discredit government in another issue while at the end it refers also to identity because only 
few things are indicating on it. Such views then having “snowball” effect and are starting to 
play “role” in topic. Likewise issues could be identified in many other topics of social 
sciences. What was intended to analyze and explain is that topic of identity is view that 
construction of actor’s identity cannot be transparently analyzed by having predisposition that 
there is one or whatever number of generally applicable concepts of identity or whatever 
number of the “right” identities. Identity is specific set of elements that are “generated” by 
and for specific community, while each has its particular elements, components. 
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Aim 
For the purpose of examining or challenging the context mentioned above, thesis is applying 
research question - Is Russian Identity Strong Enough for Consistent Foreign Policy?, and 
also, thesis is forming complementary question – How is the Conflict Between the Russia and 
the West Perceived Through the Dynamic of Russian Identity Construction. 
Aim of this thesis is to analyze the official activity of different social but mainly political 
actors in the process of construction of Russian identity in the researched period of 2010 until 
2016. Such construction in the time period is beneficial for evaluating possible progress or 
regress in the set of researched issue; as well it helps to consider whether researched object 
which is Russian identity is formed due to accidental circumstances, or it is planed consistent 
form of strategy. Nevertheless, time horizon is also useful in comparison of two different 
administrations of the researched country – presidential terms of Dmitry Medvedev and 
Vladimir Putin. Mentioned approach is crucial in order to reach the answers on formulated 
questions, while thesis will prove the level of consistency and influence of Russian identity 
construction into foreign policy of Russia and also will analyze what role is dynamic of 
Russian identity construction playing in the conflict between the Russia and the West. 
West is in this research understood as the group of countries with the liberal democracy as the 
official political ideology. Additionally, West is represented by the NATO and EU members.  
International environment is meant as a set of various active objects that are creating 
international relations, as states, organizations, communities, representatives. 
 
 
Objectives 
In order to achieve the aim of this research, it is important to set the objectives. Fulfilling of 
correctly chosen objectives is making the ground of research framework coherent, as well the 
connection of proper objectives is making the outcomes and conclusion of analysis evident.  
As the main object of this thesis is identity, first and primary objective is to constitute the 
meaning of identity that is used in this research, that is to define the theoretical approaches 
that are used for analysis of identity and what are these approaches meaning under the term of 
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identity. The whole thesis works with the theoretical approaches of constructivism and 
primordialism and their relation to identity.  
Second objective is to make literature review on the Russian identity in order to understand 
what are the trends in this research, what approaches are scholars using and what are their 
conclusions. This is beneficial in realizing what are these debates missing, why are they 
divided and what is their common opinion on the issue. It allows to understand the 
perspectives of analyses on Russian identity and to balance the context that is missing in other 
researches. 
Next objective is to make research on historical overview of Russian identity that is useful in 
realizing its evolution and its influence on identity in contemporary by creating the parallels 
between the similar and past events in this topic. 
Final objective is to analyze the official documents issued by the Russian administration in 
identity discourse and identify in them the most crucial components that are influential in 
Russian identity construction. Additionally, it is important to examine the role of those 
components towards Russia’s foreign policy. The official documents are including transcripts, 
speeches, news, documents, laws and amendments of Russian Presidents, as well of 
governments. 
Methodology 
The method of research performed in this thesis indicates the use of historic approach 
supplemented with documentary analysis. It is historic approach because analysis is in fact 
focused on the events that were arranged through the past until contemporary, furthermore 
one whole chapter of thesis is accorded to deeper historical perspective on the topic, while 
other two chapters are referred to period of 2010-2016.  
It is supplemented with documentary analysis because majority of empirical evidence on 
Russian identity as object of this research is collected from the official documents of Russian 
Federation. Whole basis that is necessary to achieve aim of this research is analyzed in these 
documents.  
. 
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Chapter 1: Theoretical Analysis on Identity, Constructivism, Primordialism 
and Literature Review –Mainstream Interpretations of Russian Identity 
Issue in Contemporary Literature 
Discussion over the topic of Russian Identity and identity in general over the last few years is 
very intensive. The opinions and views on this topic of Western group and Russian (pro-
Russian) group of researchers are different, nevertheless these opinions differs also within the 
one group. Before the proceeding to the review of these discussions, it is necessary to 
recognize what it is understood under the notion of identity in international relations, as well 
its development and its desire in this social science. For this aim, following theoretical 
analysis review starts with theoretical explanations of identity in two theoretical approaches in 
order to better understand the issue and to make a framework of topic in primary sources, 
which are the official documents in Russian identity discourse. Second purpose of this chapter 
is to make a general overview on mainstream interpretations of Russian identity, different 
perspectives on this topic with various backgrounds within last seven years; these are the 
secondary sources of this analysis. These, predominantly constructivist’s titles of different 
authors were beneficial in order to realize in what discourse is Russian identity analyzed, 
while identifying the issues of terms as interests, ethnicity and nationalism, as well their 
presence or influence in social relations, specifically in Russian identity. Research of articles 
from different authors are useful to find out on which points they do and do not agree, and 
also they are beneficial for stimulation to look on the object of analysis from various 
perspectives. This part of literature is essential for the purpose of making a theoretical 
framework that was later applied to the research of the dynamic of Russian identity 
construction and its examination. 
The second category of literature used for the purpose of this study consists of empirical 
research what are the primary sources of this thesis. In order to analyze the issue of 
development of Russian identity, this research used official documents of Russian 
administration as well speeches, statements, amendments and actions of various social actors, 
mainly presidents of Russian Federation-Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin which are 
responsible for executive power in country and so were the most important element regarding 
to this topic. These actors, their action respectively are the primary sources which are 
evaluated in research part of dissertation, chapter 3 and 4. 
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1.1 Identity in Global Politics 
Occurrence of the term “identity” in social analysis and its further spread among the social 
sciences was presented in the 1960s in the USA. German-born psycho-sociologist Erik 
Erikson was the most important scholar for development and popularization of identity and 
introduction of the term “identity crisis” into social sciences. It is taken that identification was 
developed originally from psychoanalytic context introduced by S. Freud, and further 
connected with the ethnicity and sociological role together with reference group theory1. 
Since this period the term identity started to proliferate among the journalists and 
academicians as well started to play the role in social and political analysis. Different 
politicians and movements initiated to pay the attention towards identity politics with 
accordance to their different issues regarding ethnicity, nationalism, gender, religion, culture 
or race. 
Introduction of identity in global politics is related with finding of an alternative towards the 
realists and liberals and their construction of international behavior. The concept of identity in 
International relations (IR) is the one which helps us to understand the social or political 
action and motivation to act in specific way of particular actor. Identity is essential for 
recognition of one group of same people according to unique characteristics – “self”, and their 
division towards the different – “other”. Various theoretical explanations of IR and individual 
scholars are suggesting different relevance to the actor’s identity, while the theoretical 
explanations of identity and its relation to IR chosen in this dissertation are constructivism 
and primordialism. Mentioned theories are analyzing the role of identity in social interaction 
and global politics, as well are making theoretical perspectives on topic researched in this 
thesis. Purpose of choosing these two theories lies in their contradictions on the basic opinion 
on identity whether it is changeable or not. Such approach can cover broader identity 
discourse as well it is essential in finding the “breakthrough” between the theories, thus new 
perspective on elaborating of identity. 
 
 
                                                          
1 Brubaker R. Cooper F. Beyond “identity”// Theory and Society, Vol. 29 , # 1, 2000. P. 2 
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1.1.1 Role of Identity in Constructivism as International Relations Theory 
Constructivism as one of the theories of international relations is essential in realizing of 
social construction of behavior among the states and application of identity to problems 
connected with global politics. However, there are different opinions on the role of identity 
among the constructivist scholars mainly with regards to the issues as how is the identity 
constructed and how are identities changing within the time periods. Purpose of this 
paragraph is to elucidate the most significant opinions on topic of identity and elements 
intertwined with it, in order of better understanding the core of research in this dissertation. 
Nevertheless, by promoting of constructivist approach of identity is not meaning that whole 
research based in this thesis is oriented on theory of constructivism, however, we cannot deny 
that international reality is socially constructed what is the essence of constructivist study.  
Development of constructivism in IR is intertwined with the downfall of the Cold War period, 
in the late 1980’s. With regards to Friedrich Kratochwil (1989), “in a socially constructed 
world the existence of cause and effect relations, arrangements and also states themselves are 
dependent on networks of meaning and practices which constitute them.”2 These features 
could be sometimes relatively stable, albeit never fixed or confused for permanent objects. In 
contrast to “materialistic” ideas of (neo) realism and (neo) liberalism, social approach of 
constructivism is focusing on institutionalized and intersubjective ideas that are shared among 
people and expressed as practice, interests or identities. According to Jeffrey Legro as large 
organizations are requiring ideas to guide them in their interactions in the international field, 
similar nature of ideas is needed for nations or large societies in order to clarify to their 
members what they stands for; meaning that “ideas are not so much mental as symbolic and 
organizational; they are embedded not only in human brains but also in the collective 
memories, government procedures, educational systems, and the rhetoric of statecraft.”3    
Thus, theory of constructivism is proposing that material units as for example military, 
borders or oil must be perceived through the social concepts that define their meaning for 
human life.  
                                                          
2 Kratochwil F. (1989) in Hurd I. The Oxford Handbook of International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008. P. 300 
3Legro J. W. Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order. Ne w York: Cornell 
University Press, 2005, P. 6 
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Important element in study of international relations and as well important denominator of 
research in this thesis is the role of (state/national) interest. In constructivist theory, the 
formation of interest is socially influenced and to particular extent interest is intertwined or is 
the product of identity. The relation between interest and identity lies in actor’s interactions in 
society; actor’s common identification in beliefs, expectations, role-specific understandings of 
common environment what can be a starter to gain more prestige or social recognition in 
socially constructed world of different actors, thus the generator for the interests. This means 
that the process of interest construction depends on many social processes and interactions as 
historical experiences, socialization, internalization, and the effects of social norms including 
the desire to create norms that legitimize one’s behavior, altogether with presence or absence 
of a sense of community.4   
In contrast, non-constructivist theories insists that the nature or influence on construction of 
actor’s interests is for practical reasons stable and includes combinations of their desires, 
stating that socially constructed interests are not changing the fact that the primary interests of 
actors are indicated by the material capabilities and situation of the actors, “and so states are 
either constructed by material forces or can be treated as if their construction is irrelevant to 
their interests and behavior.”5 
Among the first researchers who introduced the term of constructivism to the theories of IR 
was Nicholas G. Onuf. According to him, it is the phenomenon of human nature and its 
further action to construct social facts and relations among the individuals and states6, rather 
than (neo) realist’s opinions that international politics is influenced by the egoist actors and 
their utilitarian calculations. Onuf is simply putting attention to that the world is constructed 
by language, race, culture, gender or class inequality, instead of results promoted by the 
nature of politics or settings beyond the control of human nature.  
Further development of constructivism in IR was presented by Alexander Wendt and his 
“social construction” of international system. Wendt’s acquisition to constructivism lies in his 
alternative to materialism which is represented mainly by realism and liberalism. He assumes 
                                                          
4Hurd I. The Oxford Handbook of International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. P. 303 
5Hurd I. The Oxford Handbook of International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. P. 302 
6Onuf N. G. World of Our Making, Rules and rule in social theory and international relations. New York: 
Routledge, 1989.  
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that “a fundamental principle of constructivist theory is that people act toward objects, 
including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them.”7 In his 
article Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics (1992) 
Wendt is developing a sociological argument on behalf of the liberal claim stating that 
international institutions can transform state identities and interests, which is involving a 
“sociological, social psychological” form of systemic theory in which identities and interests 
are the dependent variable8. Wendt is also opposing claims of (neo) realists stating that the 
existence of self-help9 and power politics are in international relations due to process, not 
structure of politics, as well they are institutions of world politics instead of features of 
anarchy.10 Furthermore, he is creating confident arguments how are these instruments as self-
help and power politics constructed under anarchy, as well Wendt is also proposing three 
ways in which interests and identities are transformed under anarchy: by an evolution of 
cooperation, by the institution of sovereignty, and by intentional efforts that transform 
egoistic identities into collective identities – one can assume the role of globalization in here.  
Identity and interests in Wendt’s ideology of foreign policy plays endogenous role to the state 
system as a part of fully socialized systemic theory11. This point is stressing the importance of 
identity and interests in understanding of actor’s behavior in social sciences, and international 
relations particularly. Wendt treats identity as a “property of intentional actors that generates 
motivational and behavioral dispositions” with a “subjective or unit-level quality, rooted in an 
                                                          
7 Wendt A. Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics // International 
Organization, Vol. 46, # 2, 1992. P.  396–397 
8 Wendt A. Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics // International 
Organization, Vol. 46, # 2, 1992. P. 394 
9 Wendt A. Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics // International 
Organization, Vol. 46, # 2, 1992. P. 392 – “This starting point makes substantive sense for neorealists, since 
they believe anarchies are necessarily "self-help" systems, systems in which both central authority and 
collective security are absent. The self-help corollary to anarchy does enormous work in neorealism, generating 
the inherently competitive dynamics of the security dilemma and collective action problem. Self-help is not 
seen as an "institution" and as such occupies a privileged explanatory role vis-a-vis process, setting the terms 
for, and unaffected by, interaction. Since states failing to conform to the logic of self-help will be driven from 
the system, only simple learning or behavioral adaptation is possible; the complex learning involved in 
redefinitions of identity and interest is not.' Questions about identity- and interest-formation are therefore not 
important to students of international relations. A rationalist problematique, which reduces process to 
dynamics of behavioral interaction among exogenously constituted actors, defines the scope of systemic 
theory” 
10 Wendt A. Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics // International 
Organization, Vol. 46, # 2, 1992. P. 394-395 
11 Wendt A. Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics // International 
Organization, Vol. 46, # 2, 1992. P. 402 
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actor’s self-understanding”12. According to him, identities are constituted by ideas held by the 
self and those held by the other, meaning that they are constituted by internal and external 
structures. Nevertheless, Wendt is also stressing the existence of various “kinds” of identities, 
dependent of internal-external relationship, describing four of them as follows – personal or 
corporate; type; role and collective, however, he is mentioning that these definitions are 
definitive. In contrast to possible admit of realists that while the global system is socially 
constructed, corresponding interests and identities are almost impossible to transform once 
they become institutionalized, Wendt is opposing and promoting three institutional 
transformations of identity and security interests, thus clarifying that “institutions transform 
identities and interests”13.  
Furthermore, Wendt adds other factors under anarchic context that can transform identities 
and interests collectively and which are an important dependent variable, such as – domestic, 
transnational, systemic or individual factor. However, he points out that relative coherence of 
interests and identity in the real world is characteristics of our inclination for habitual, rather 
than creative action, and if actors were continually reinventing or transforming their identity, 
social order would be impossible. This is further analyzed by Wendt’s conclusion that 
identities and interests should not be treated as given in every instance, while the research 
strategy or definition of problems in IR should be question-driven instead of method-driven 
and if the research is not interested in identity and interest formation, assumptions of 
rationalists would be fully reasonable.14By analyzing that anarchy is what states make of it 
and underlying important processes of identity and interest formation in global politics which 
were absent in constructivism before, Wendt’s article is making a significant part of 
theoretical basis for the research of identity in this dissertation.  
To conclude this section, analysis of constructivism has indicated that many elements of IR 
are socially constructed instead of being managed by uncontrollable nature of human being or 
the nature of politics. Perception of international relations in constructivist’s terms means 
taking into account what states and people think and how they behave in global politics with 
                                                          
12 Wendt A. Social Theory of International Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999. P.  224 
13Wendt A. Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics // International 
Organization, Vol. 46, # 2, 1992. P.  412 
14 Wendt A. Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics // International 
Organization, Vol. 46, # 2, 1992. P. 423 
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emphasis on social construction of particular actors, events or institutions. This includes 
social processes and interactions with focus on actor’s beliefs about the world, historical 
evolution, shared understandings and practices as well the identity about self and others. 
Although, the shift from (neo) liberal and (neo) realist’s conceptions of international relations 
to socially constructed assumptions was very dubious in the beginning of 1990s, gradually it 
became widely respected among the researchers. The fact that the materialist theories of 
international relations are adopting some elements taken from constructivism as for example 
socially constructed interests15, is making the boundaries of international relations theories 
more intertwined, creating the possibility of emergence of artificial distinctions among them. 
However, by defining the terms and meanings of notions in particular concept it is making 
itself clear what is the real object of this study, thus by a part, introducing the meaning of 
identity in constructivist’s terms. Nevertheless, by promoting of constructivist approach of 
identity is not meaning that whole research based in this thesis is oriented on theory of 
constructivism, however, we cannot deny that international reality is socially constructed what 
is the essence of constructivist study. 
1.1.2 Criticism of Constructivist’s Identity 
Interesting comments and analysis on constructivist’s identity is formulated by R. Brubaker 
and F. Cooper (2000) in their article Beyond “identity”. They argue that mainstream 
constructivist stance on identity surrounded by the attempts to “soften” the term and dispose 
“essentialism” of it by setting identity multiple, fluid and constructed is making the term 
irrational and irrelevant for examining the “hard dynamics and essentialist claims of 
contemporary identity politics.”16 Rather than promoting identity as a constructed or defining 
it as fluid and multiple, their approach towards identity is to use it as a social analytical 
concept. Authors insists that concept of “social analysis” of identity is helpful for better 
understanding of the “claims and possibilities that arise from particular affinities and 
affiliations, from particular commonalities and connections, from particular stories and self-
understandings, from particular problems and predicaments in more differentiated manner”, 
                                                          
15 Hurd I. The Oxford Handbook of International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. P. 301 
16 Brubaker R. Cooper F. Beyond “identity”// Theory and Society , Vol. 29 , # 1, 2000. P. 1 
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meaning to go “beyond” identity not in the name of imagined universalism but rather in 
meaning of conceptual clarity required for social analysis and political understanding17. 
1.2. Primordialism as Social Theory and Identity 
Contrary to constructivist’s socially constructed reality, primordialism states that social 
structure and its development is ancient, natural phenomenon, while its ideas can be traced in 
the German Romanticism. Primordialism insists that in order to make an analysis of particular 
“national identity” first of all it is important to interpret the term of nation. Nation in terms of 
primordialism is associated with community that is united by individuals on the basis of 
“same blood and common values.”18 Furthermore, nation lies somewhere between the ethnic 
community and state, while it can be defined in two different meanings. Firstly it can be an 
ethnic community or ethno-nation, and as a political community or state as a second meaning. 
However, primordialism emphasizes that state is exclusively instrumental social organization 
which is not belonging into primordial types of community.  Another important element of 
identity in primordialism is the term of ethnic community. Geertz (1963) insists that 
“primordial attachments are created on social level of community when it shares ideas of 
blood ties and same speech, religion, territory, customs and traditions”19 while those ideas are 
further developing ethnic community. Such interpretation of nation and ethnic community is 
making a reference to the ethnicity as undeniable variable to nation, thus creating the “ethno-
nation”. Accordingly, term “ethno” is influential in primordial vision also in providing 
deepest identity for individuals, thus creating “ethno-identity.” This identity is in 
primordialism unchangeable, deeply rooted in individual and is given to member of 
community once he was born.  
 
With respect to close relation between nation and identity and not only in primordial terms, 
Anderson (1983) states that in order to understand membership to particular nation, thus 
“nation-ness” (nationality) as a cultural artifact of particular kind, firstly we need to consider 
its historical being and how did its meanings changed and evolved through the time altogether 
                                                          
17 Brubaker R. Cooper F. Beyond “identity”// Theory and Society, Vol. 29, # 1, 2000. P. 36 
18 Bačová V. The Construction of National Identity - On Primordialism and Instrumentalism // Human Affairs, 
Vol. 8, # 1, 1998. P. 29 
19Geertz C. (1963) in Bačová V. The Construction of National Identity - On Primordialism and Instrumentalism // 
Human Affairs, Vol. 8, # 1, 1998. P. 32 
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with its powerful emotional legitimacy link in contemporary.20He further believes that those 
artifacts were developed through the history spontaneously and as they were once created, 
they gradually became capable to fulfill usefulness to various degree of self-consciousness 
and match the wide variety of needs for different political or ideological intentions. Anderson 
(1983) is arguing that the essential possibility of imagining the nation has evolved historically 
only due to the lost of value of particular cultural conceptions. These cultural conceptions as 
ontological and privileged truth in particular script-language of Christendom, Islamic Ummah 
and others; belief that society was naturally organized under and around the high centers 
necessarily hierarchical because the existence of ruler; and as for third indistinguishable 
presence of history and cosmology whereas the origins of men and world are historically 
corresponding.21 These points are clearly confirming the imagined communities on the basis 
of nations which are instrumentally constructed out of primordial conception. 
 
As for the conclusion of this paragraph, it is possible to assume that primordial social 
construction is dependent on ethnic identity towards particular ethnic community. However, 
emergence and existence of nations in 18th century is a social fact, thus strictly instrumental, 
constructivist approach is also necessary to take into account in order to understand their 
establishment. Nevertheless, development of the states is not solely dependent on the identity 
of its citizens and beliefs on social constructions whether primordial in meanings of ethnic 
communities, or whether instrumental (constructivist) in terms of national communities but 
are dependent mainly on the history of particular community. In these regards it is significant 
to make historical perspective on such construction, what is in the case of this paper - Russian 
nation/community and its identity. This approach will be useful for analysis whether 
Anderson’s three points were present in Russia’s evolution of identity until contemporary, 
thus they are influential in its identity formation also in today with reference to primordial 
theory or whether constructivist approach is in such development playing influential role. This 
will be helpful to understand background of particular concepts of identity and its dynamics. 
The value to what extent is particular community or nation influenced to primordial or 
constructivist beliefs of self national identification, determines not only content of its identity 
                                                          
20 Anderson B. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso, 
1983. P. 48 
21 Anderson B. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso, 
1983. P. 52 
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but also the extent of its identification meaning the crisis and conflicts of identity, as well 
vulnerability and the feeling of threat to its identity. Keeping Anderson’s opinion in mind will 
be helpful in order to comprehend the historical outline on Russian identity as well it can be 
useful to understand its mentioning itself with reference to contemporary identity conception 
and its dynamic to some extent. 
To sum up, constructivist’s theory on identity states that identity is changing with its 
interaction with social environment, while primordial vision declares that identity is once 
given and fixed. Aim of further research is not to prove which theory is right or not, but rather 
to identify components of Russian identity in historical approach and connect or make relation 
of them to elements of identity in official acts of Russian administration and further analyze 
them in identity discourse of both mentioned theories, creating possible “breakthrough”. 
 
1.3. Russian Identity Discourse - Common Ground 
The role of Russia’s international behavior in recent years was very inconsistent and partly 
surprising for other actors in international relations. This amazement has brought confusion 
also among the scholars and researchers as well. Russia’s inconsistency in international 
behavior intertwined with dramatic shift generated academic questions about the goals and 
basis of such policy. 
 In order to understand Russian behavior in recent period, there are various approaches among 
the academics, but probably two most influential. First, stating the undemocratic character of 
Russian political system associated with authoritarian personality of Russian President V. 
Putin. Most likely it can make sense if such research is performed consistently altogether with 
empirical evidence, but after all this issue of international and domestic behavior of particular 
country cannot be simply resolved only by concluding the structure of Russian political 
system and proposed undemocratic values. It should be supplemented also by the nature and 
social environment consisting of individuals, institutions and both formal, informal joint 
interactions among them and further interaction with international environment. This is 
exactly second important approach among academics towards this issue, thus Russian identity 
discourses.  
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This discourse is creating plenteous debate among the academics about various elements 
which are influential in defining the creation of Russian identity. However, those elements 
vary from one researcher to another; they got at least three points in common, regardless to 
their political affiliations. In first instance, all of the researched scholars agree on that there is 
an attempt or need of creation of new Russian identity, thus there is no coherent, widely 
accepted concept of Russian identity. Second point of relatively common opinion on Russian 
identity and its inconsistency is accorded to the Soviet past, and as for the third, majority of 
academics are indicating on dramatic shift of Russian identity since V. Putin third presidential 
term in 2012. These two fundamental points can be taken as a source of inspiration for 
making this analysis on Russian identity discourse. 
Points which are creating common ground among the scholars could serve as a “runway” in 
realizing questions as why has this dramatic shift in Russian identity occurred in this period, 
and why this question about Russian identity was not relevant before, why do the scholars 
agreeing only on few points, why there is no academic widely accepted consensus in question 
of Russian identity at all. Nevertheless, fact of such a fruitful set of questions or uncertainties 
and various opinions indicates that this issue is required or important among the scholars of 
IR, however, it is not the aim of this thesis to answer them all; questions for this thesis are 
already set and answers on them could provide prospects for future research that can answer 
other uncertainties in this issue. 
1.3.1 Literature Review on Russian Identity – Politically Divided Concepts 
This paragraph refers to various researchers and followers, which are supporting pro-Western, 
pro-Russian and also neutral (probably) opinions on Russian identity. All of the groups are 
suggesting different positions which are influenced to some extent by contrasting sets of 
political preferences what is creating fruitful environment for debate. As this paper is 
orienting on recent period between the years of 2010-2016, it is analyzing period not older 
than ten years in research of assumptions among the scholars with respect of making this 
analysis transparent to the context and its match with title. 
Concepts of Russian identity are traditionally dependent on its relationship mainly towards 
the West; this relationship is further outlined in historical approach. As the concept of identity 
is in its core reliant on interaction between the self and the other, relationship of West towards 
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Russia is influential in forming this concept as well. However, since the beginning of 20th 
century and also later after the split of the Soviet Union and rise of influence of Eurasianism 
in concepts of Russian identity, Russian relations towards Asian countries were influential 
with regards to identity formation as well; this topic is also further analyzed in historical 
approach. This can serve also as a “sketch” in realizing the assumptions made by scholars on 
topic of Russian identity depending on which side of political preferences and theories of 
international relations they are orienting and identifying themselves.  
The roots on the issues of contemporary Russian identity are perceived among the researchers 
in various opinions.  Some of them suppose that this issue is stemming from the crisis of 
national identity in Russia during the post-Soviet period. For example, A. Likhacheva, I. 
Makarov and E. Makarova in their article Post-Soviet Russian Identity and its Influence on 
European-Russian Relations are suggesting that “weak national identity makes it susceptible 
to political propaganda and turns identity into an instrument of foreign policy instead of 
being its key driver and determinant.”22 According to mentioned authors, Russia is in 
difficult identity situation as a consequence of Post-Soviet identity crisis, followed with the 
fracture of Russian society in ideological, religious and ethnic terms with active 
participation of elites. Inconsistent policy in solving of issues of new morality, ideology, 
religion, family or work after fall of the USSR has broaden the division among Russian 
society having a negative impact on realizing identity formation, altogether with lack of 
governmental initiative to deal with the identity search itself.  Authors are concluding that 
mentioned points filled up with negative identity are having negative impact on Russia’s 
relations with the West; as well it is having unfavorable effect on domestic policy. Their 
analysis is revealing that Russia is facing serious problems with identity on different levels 
stemming from the heritage of previous periods, while they are proposing that education 
and socialization of people would be beneficial in order to overcome of deepening this 
trend.  
Alexander Zevelev in his article Russian National Identity and Foreign Policy is also 
identifying post-Soviet identity problem as a source of issues in contemporary identity 
formation in Russia by insisting that failure of Moscow to find its place in the transatlantic 
                                                          
22 Likhacheva A., Makarov I., Makarova E. Post-Soviet Russian identity and its influence on European-Russian 
relations // European Journal of Futeres Research, Vol. 3, # 4, 2015. P. 2 
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security architecture after the Cold War led to reliance on the domestic discourses isolated 
from world process with regards to answers on international issues.  He perceives as a 
problem that during period of 1992-2011 national identity of Russia was treated as 
politically and intellectually important among the liberals, communists and centrists-
pragmatists only by nationalists. Zevelev assumes that according to historical factors, 
Russian citizens appeared from the Soviet Union “as an incomplete, under-articulated 
nation with a surprisingly low level of national consciousness, lack of mass-based national 
movement, and blurred vision of its own political boundaries.”23 Author is proposing that 
factors which are shaping Russian foreign policy are stemming from domestic ideas about 
Russian identity rather than from conceptualizations of the world order that are established 
in the theory and manner of international relations. According to him there is sort of 
consensus on these ideas among Russian elite assuming that peculiarity of Russian identity 
lies in its specific factors as history, nuclear weapons, great power and distinct civilization 
what is predicting special place for Russia within international arena. However, he 
concludes that such specific status of identity reveals itself almost inaccessible endeavor for 
a country without a “longer-than-thousand-year history as a political entity”, what would 
make excessively difficult for any future Russian leader to redefine Russian national 
identity.24 Author is identifying “big ideas” in Russian intellectual history which were 
influential in the centuries-old debates over Russian identity and which are adopted by the 
Kremlin as a prescription of its worldview including exceptionalism, special spiritual and 
civilizational mission among the Eurasian neighborhood with portrayal of West as evil. 
Differently structured position towards Russian identity crisis is proposed by Murod 
Ismailov and Nozima Ganieva. In their article In Search for the Russian National Identity: 
Do History Textbooks Hold the Answer? they are proposing that crisis of Russian identity is 
“connected to unresolved issues of a three-fold dimension”, intertwined with obstructions to 
elevate national identity after the fall of USSR. They insist that first dimension is bounded 
with the essence of Soviet Union formation as a huge multinational state with the lack of 
instituted nation-state or new form of imperialism. Thus, the legacies of Soviet past as 
national formation at the level of secondary units within the Soviet Union or drawing the 
clear boundaries between “Russian proper” and non-Russian areas are the heritage of past 
                                                          
23 Zevelev I. Russian National Identity and Foreign Policy, Washington, DC: CSIS, 2016. P. 8 
24 Zevelev I. Russian National Identity and Foreign Policy, Washington, DC: CSIS, 2016. P. 18 
 24 
 
which are making the process of national identity formation uncertain in contemporary.25 
Second dimension according to authors is regarded to “dilemmas of civic or ethnic nation-
building”. These dilemmas are stemming from “dual” civic identity mentioned also further 
in Goble’s article as “Russkiy” dealing with inclusive citizenship and “Rossiiskiy” based on 
exclusive ethnic identity with regards to culture, language or religion. As for the third 
dimension, authors are stressing the uncertainty of Russia’s belonging to East or West 
according to its identity. This uncertainty is reflected from the partial consideration of 
Russia on its special path of unique multiethnic civilization differing from the western one, 
altogether with depicting of USA as its significant “other”, and partially from reflection of 
Russia as a country with western origins, culture and values.26 
Other authors are choosing different perspective on analysis of Russian identity. For 
example, Paul Goble is analyzing Russian identity on the background of the Ukrainian crisis 
started in 2013, respectively 2014, while he is comparing the Ukrainian identity with the 
Russian one. In his article Russian National Identity and the Ukrainian Crisis, Goble is 
highlighting the fragility of Russian identity and the incomplete essence of Putin’s actions 
mainly under the doctrine of “Russian World”. Author is drawing attention to unexpected 
strength of Ukrainian identity in civil and ethnic meanings, comparing with far more weak 
and fragmented Russian identity. Article is describing factors on uncertainty of Russian 
identity, starting with the elements that were influential to make promotion of national 
identity in state-controlled media at the end ineffective: reactions on the increasingly 
numerous non-Russian nationalities to any ethnic Russian identifications; tensions inherent 
between identities that state supports and those it fears, and fundamental weakness of 
Russian identity.27 Goble is supporting his article also with statements of other authors, as 
for example with Russian political scientist and nationalist Pavel Svyatenkov. He argues 
that Russia lacks supra-national non ethnic identity which the state has wanted. This is 
stemming from inconsistency in Russian national movement which “is in essence a union of 
subcultures” what could be constructive only “if the subcultures existed on the basis of a 
                                                          
25 Ismailov M., Ganieva N. In Search for the Russian National Identity: Do History Textbooks Hold the Answer? 
// Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences, Vol. 5, # 2, 2013. P. 367 
26 Ismailov M., Ganieva N. In Search for the Russian National Identity: Do History Textbooks Hold the Answer? 
// Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences, Vol. 5, # 2, 2013. P. 367-368 
27 Goble P. Russian national identity and Ukrainian crisis //  Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 49, # 
1, 2016. P. 37 
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single Russian identity”. Instead, they are operating on the basis of subcultures creating 
their own identity, what can led to that that subcultures will start replacing the nation in 
future.28 Goble is outlying inconsistency of Russian identity further on the basis of its 
unclear formulation and comparing it with coherently formulated Ukrainian identity, which 
is based on “consciousness” and “the acceptance of ‘Ukrainism’ as an ideological anti-
Russian doctrine”. At this stage he is presenting interesting point of ability of such doctrine 
that is capability to integrate outsiders, meaning that “study Ukrainian and say that you 
Ukrainian”. With comparison to Russian nationalist act which is working on the basis of 
excluding people due to their inheritance or something else. Such excluding is presented 
also by Svyatenkov saying “the concept of ‘a drop of non-Russian blood’ dominates,” what 
is basically meaning that anybody without Russian ancestors will not be integrated as a 
Russian, no matter how he wants.  
The split in formulation of Russian identity in Goble’s article is also suggested by director 
of Russian Public Opinion Research Center Valery Fedorov. According to him, existence of 
two different linguistic concepts for understanding Russian identity as “Rossiisky” which 
implies to the Russian state and Russian citizenship; and word “Russky” that denotes to 
ethnic Russian identity,29 is only underlying the inconsistency in Russian identity. Editor of 
Kazan’s “Zvezda Povolzhya”, Rashit Akhmetov is putting attention on combination of a 
civic Russian identity with Putin’s “authoritarian and great chauvinist approach” what is 
worsening ethnic identities of Russians and non-Russians.30 Thus, collision of civic and 
ethnic identities is limiting the ability of Russian and non-Russian people living inside 
Russian Federation to solidify their identities. Another insufficient idea with regards to 
Russian identity introduced in Goble’s article is drawing lines of Moscow Institute of 
Ethnology and Anthropology director Valery Tishkov. Tishkov’s idea of creating civic 
Russian identity on the basis of Soviet people with regards to American experience is seeing 
inapplicable, as far as the US common identity was constructed on level of tolerance 
towards diversity as a kind of “melting pot”, while historically neither Russian Empire or 
                                                          
28 Svyatenkov P. (2014) in Goble P. Russian national identity and Ukrainian crisis //  Communist and Post-
Communist Studies, Vol. 49, # 1, 2016. P. 38 
29 Fedorov V. (2013) in Goble P. Russian national identity and Ukrainian crisis // Communist and Post-
Communist Studies, Vol. 49, # 1, 2016. P. 39 
30 Akhmetov, R. (2014) in Goble P. Russian national identity and Ukrainian crisis // Communist and Post-
Communist Studies, Vol. 49, # 1, 2016. P. 39 
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USSR, nor Russian Federation in contemporary is not capable of becoming melting pot 
society, due to fact of imposing one identity, thus keeping the people apart.31 By constant 
press of Kremlin for a single “supra-national” identity and not accepting its distinctions, it is 
presenting risk for non-Russian part of population. According to Akhmetov, at this point is 
Tishkov’s idea “Rossiyane” falling apart with Putin’s “Russian world” and “Novorossiya” 
concept.32  
Another important argument of unsuccessful promotion of supra-national identity through 
the state media is the alliance between Kremlin and Russian Orthodox Church. With respect 
to Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin, any effort to subsume Russians into larger groups or giving 
them any “new artificial identities is absolutely incorrect, Russians should not be afraid of 
being quite specific about who they are and about questions concerning their ‘national self-
consciousness.”33The first deputy chairman of the Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD) of 
Russia, Damir Mukhetdinov is not seeing his community as the part of Putin’s “Russian 
World” pointing on fact that Islam is very much part of Russia, while stressing the evidence 
that Russian constitution specifies no state ideology, nevertheless he assumes that 
restoration of “Russian World” is kind of “proto-ideology”, what cannot be taken into 
account among Muslim population34. The chair of the Carnegie Moscow Center’s Religion, 
Society and Security Program, Aleksey Malashenko completes Mukhetdinov’s opinion by 
stating that Islamic self-identification is not corresponding to Russian one, while it “exists 
independently and is linked more closely to processes taking place in the world’s Islamic 
Umma.35” 
Nationalists are playing also influential role in defining of Russian identity fragmentation in 
Goble’s article. Ukrainian commentator Aleksey Kupras is pointing on active support of 
Russian authorities of “great power ideology by financing some mega radical groups”. 
According to Kupras, in period between 2008-2014 there was huge increase of radical 
                                                          
31 Goble P. Russian national identity and Ukrainian crisis // Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 49, 
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movements in Russia which can be divided between pro-Kremlin and anti-authority ones. 
Kupras is pointing on around 500 camps established in 2014 to provide basic military 
training for radical nationalists, more than half of them were pro-Kremlin which “officially 
works as a recruitment points for the war with Ukraine.36” Kupras insists that Putin’s 
possible too soft approach towards Ukraine can probably face a “Right Sector Threat” 
similarly like the Ukraine does. Even the shift of the Moscow’s policy towards radical 
nationalism followed by persecutions and launching the criminal investigations against 
them in order to negotiate could be counterproductive in the way that it can attract new anti -
Kremlin members, as Kupras shows that in the period of 18 months has number of members 
in radical groups “almost doubled.” In addition, radical Russian nationalist Dmitry 
Demushkin states that government is threatening and persecuting the nationalists no matter 
their affiliation or position towards governmental questions, what is suggesting the struggles 
of Kremlin to promote only their form of identity.37 Another Russian commentator 
Yekaterina Schulmann identifies “strange symbiotic relations” between the Russian 
nationalist movement and political management together with special services with regards 
to “cracking the whip” sometimes in order to show “who is in charge of whom”, with 
further suggestion that nationalists are being misused for the Putin’s purposes and his extra 
glorification as the only fighter against Russian fascism.38  
Regarding to Eurasian identity, Malashenko suggests that hardly anyone among the 
Russians, Avars or Tatars will consider himself definitely as an Euro-Asian. According to 
him people understand Europe and Asia, however, “Eurasian perestroika is not 
understandable a priori”, same as imperial identity “cannot provide the basis for a new 
identity within the Russian Federation’s current borders.”39 
Examining Goble’s article, we can observe little bit different logic in assessing of crisis in 
Russian identity than in previous articles. He is constructing his opinion of fragmented 
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Russian identity on the background of particular political orientation of Vladimir Putin 
towards the crisis in Ukraine, with supplementing of particular political actions on domestic 
arena of Russia. He is proposing that specific political decisions of Russian president in 
foreign and domestic affairs in the name of “Russian World” identity doctrine and with 
objective to achieve as much centralized power as possible are contra-productive, creating 
negative and fragmenting impact on Russian identity. Nevertheless, in order to assume and 
analyze the differences or his position towards the evaluation of Russian identity it is 
somehow important to mention the possibility of contradictory political stances of Goble 
together with other researchers used in his article towards ruling government in Russia, 
meaning that opposition is always biased in most cases against all the elements of the side 
towards which is its opposition aimed. After all, political bias and media framing is efficient 
in majority analyses of Russian identity as it was outlined in introduction already. 
Another author which is outlining Russian identity construction on the background of 
Ukrainian crisis and Crimean annexation is Yuri Teper. In his article Official Russian 
identity discourse in light of the annexation of Crimea: national or imperial? Teper is 
analyzing this conflict more in primordial vision rather than Goble’s constructivist analysis 
of Russian identity crisis and its development since the 2013. He is stressing that Russia’s 
involvement in this conflict was to large extent described by ethnicization of the identity 
discourse40 in ethno-cultural and ethno-lingual terms and Russia was portrayed as a territory 
of ethnic Russians. Pointing on the discourse of official Russian identity towards its 
ethnicization, Teper is showing the shift in Kremlin’s promotion of identity from previously 
state-oriented point of reference for constructing identity. Author is concluding with the 
idea that the annexation of Crimea and the official identity discourse on it allowed political 
leadership to saw a potential in ethno-national appeal as well its popular agenda has forced 
itself to find a definition for previously ambiguous Russia’s national concept.  
Interesting consideration on the topic of Russian identity is presented by Boris Dubin. He is 
presenting a notion of a “uniquely Russian path” as a source of identity with reference on 
sociological survey data to considerations of Russians whether Russia should take a special 
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path that distinguishes it from all other states.41 By reviewing such surveys he is analyzing 
that three of five Russian adults agree that Russia should develop itself in accordance with 
its special path, while finding out that Russian uniqueness is stemming more from negative 
view of the other. Importance of his research for identity analysis lies in repeatedly 
recurring and most common held positions of Russian’s regarded to significant 
characteristics and Russian uniqueness. Among the most positions for the purpose of this 
paper were perceptions of differences in values between Russia and West; opinions that the 
ruling elite is the force that establish the society and collective identity; preferences for 
sameness and at the same time rejection of differences that is meaning inclination to 
collective character of society in order to prevent individual initiative with respect to 
Russian specialness and perception of rejecting that is special, external or separate within 
society; Furthermore, it showed importance of particular characteristics of Russians self 
description, thus special character of individual as the result of historical circumstances.42 
Dubin’s analysis can serve as a way to understanding and confirming the importance of 
collective identity for the majority of Russians, as well it shows the possibility of its 
function of representing that identity as a whole by ruling elites. 
Similar analysis of the surveys was made also by V.I. Pantin (2010) in his article The 
Political and Civilizational Self-Identity of Contemporary Russian Society in a Global 
Context. He suggests that the citizen’s opinions about the special path of the Russia’s 
development and a special character of Russian civilization are conflicting, what is a 
reflection of unstable situation in which is Russian identity going through the crisis .43  
Marlene Laruelle (2014) prefers the opinion that Russian identity promoted by Kremlin is 
based on Soviet nostalgia that oversteps social and ideological divisions, while she believes 
that “Russkaia ideia” discourse is profoundly determined by the Soviet ideas and Kremlin’s 
efforts to promote militarized patriotism.44 Laruelle argues that content of certain Russian 
television channels are shaping cultural and political consensus in Russian society, 
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furthermore she hypothesizes that television is a central driver of identity debates in Russia. 
Laruelle criticize that broadcast of Russian identity is taken in traditional framework leaving 
no room for a modern and globalised form of identity debate, allowing the space for 
primordialist interpretations. In this case it is necessary to contradict Laruelle’s opinion, 
what if the Russian identity is specific also in that that it defends itself from the process of 
globalization, to preserve its “uniqueness”, “special, civilizational role” which is mentioned 
for example in Dubin’s research among Russian citizens and which is also mentioned in 
philosophical views throughout the Russian history what will be mentioned as well in next 
chapter, accidentally, isn’t precisely this primordial opinion, by any chance.(?) From the 
previous research answer on this rhetorical question should be evident and as well as 
background of Laruelle’s opinion. 
Aim of this paragraph was to introduce few positions on the state of Russian identity among 
the scholars during the period not later than ten years, however majority of them are not 
older than seven years. It is possible to observe that opinions on Russian identity are divided 
in various terms and perspectives, however, the authors have got at least one point in 
common – that concept of Russian identity is uncertain and is weak respectively. Some of 
the authors are analyzing the roots of this issue in recent past, arguing that problems are 
stemming from Soviet and Post-Soviet insufficient attention towards identity. Others are 
suggesting that building of the concept of identity on the basis of ethnicity with regards to 
“Russian World” is counterproductive for Moscow’s domestic and foreign policy with 
respect to the rise of tensions and nationalism between the various ethnic groups living on 
the territory of Russian Federation as well it is bringing the suspicion and difficulties to 
promote Russian education and culture in Post-Soviet countries with significant Russian 
population. Opinions of authors are diffusing with respect to which particular element of 
identity they are discussing in accordance to specific political action among the Russian 
society or government and with regards through which “scope” of theoretical perspective 
they are analyzing it, nevertheless, we cannot forget about their political affiliation and 
various biases. This is creating plenteous uncertainty as well discussion on the topic of 
Russian identity, what is having to some extent also neglecting impact on conflict between 
Russia and the West due to political affiliations and spreading of debates. Aim of this 
analysis is not to spread uncertainty on Russian identity any further, its aim is to 
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chronologically define that construction of Russian identity between 2010 and 2016 was 
taken in particular dynamic, under the specific tenets with peculiar outcomes and explicit 
results. That this dynamic was not evolving accidentally within the situations in domestic 
and international arena, but it was gradually modified effort to respond on these challenges 
with accordance to lines of specific identity construction in order to promote and put 
together precise concept that will have effect in domestic and foreign issues as well. Next 
chapters are attempting to build up proposed intention as well are making conclusion on 
such development with answer to the research question (s) and potential insights for the 
future.  
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Chapter 2. Evolution of Russian Identity – Historical approach 
Similarly as in many other topics, “iron rule” of history is applicable also in topic of identity. 
Understanding of Russian identity formation throughout the history is beneficial for 
understanding specific components of Russian identity in contemporary. It is important in 
realizing the assumptions of constructivism with regards to observation of changes of Russian 
identity during the different periods as well context of such changes. Similarly, historic 
approach is significant for primordialist view on identity in identifying whether there are 
components which are in Russian identity invariable, stable through the whole period of 
evolvement. This chapter will gradually analyze most significant events of Russian identity 
formation during different periods and identify crucial elements of identity in them. 
2.1 Historical Perspective on Russian Identity 
The rule of the Peter the Great is considered to be one of the biggest milestones in Russian 
history. It is possible to assume that beginning of Russia’s realization in identity issues started 
also due to his efforts of modernization of Russia in many spheres. His contribution towards 
culture, society, government or science according to western image provided the split of 
“traditional” approach towards daily issues among society and introduced the new, more 
“cultivated” one. The fact that Peter the Great ignited broader correlation between Russia and 
West has reflected later in philosophical cleavage and debates about Russia’s identity 
belonging. Those debates started to be more tenacious in the beginning of the 19th century 
mainly among the proponents of traditional, uniquely Russian way of development strongly 
influenced by Orthodox Church, labeling themselves as “Slavophiles”. In contrast, 
“Zapadniki” (Westernizers) philosophical camp was advocating western economic, industrial, 
cultural or political reforms in order to make Russia more advanced, comparable with West. 
Remarkably, it is possible to observe Russian identity formation at least since the eighteen 
century, since when Europe acted as a relatively stable “constituting other” with the set of 
geopolitical, economic and cultural factors according to which was Russian identity defining 
and redefining45.  
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2.1.1 Slavophiles 
The core of Slavophile thought was formulated by ideas of Russian poet Aleksey Khomyakov 
and literary critic Ivan Kireevsky in the second half of 19th century. As a byproduct of cultural 
westernization imported by Peter the Great, Slavophiles were distinguishing themselves from 
the majority of people by their culturally traditional values, education and mainly by their 
breach towards western community values. They insisted that only guarantee of Russia’s great 
future lies in its emphasis to preserve its traditional way of development. Significant role in 
their thought was presented by the Orthodox Church as a basis of Russian culture, as well as a 
“carrier” of spiritual enlightenment of both peoples and national idea contrary to the western 
logical and empirical way of enlightenment.46 Central role of Orthodox Church in Slavophile 
philosophy was determining its main ideology of behavior and role or purpose of Russia in 
the world. This ideology called “Sobornost” was introduced by A. Khomyakov and was 
basically doctrine of “togetherness”, a type of harmonious spiritual life and an antithesis 
towards the authoritarian Roman Church and western individualism which was insisting on all 
nations coming together for the purpose of common, holly good. Slavophiles believed that 
Russia due to its geographical position can serve as a bridge connecting the cultures of Asia 
and Europe with the help of Orthodox Church what is making Russia’s unique destiny. 
According to prominent Russian philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev: “The Slavophiles not only 
defined our national consciousness as religious in spirit and purpose, but formulated the 
basic theme of East and West. This theme suffused the entire intellectual life of nineteenth-
century Russia.”47 Paradoxically, majority of important Slavophiles received their education 
in Europe; as well they were interested into German philosophy that they were misusing in 
their declarations against the ideas of Westernizers. As for example of Russia’s unique 
destiny with regards to Hegel’s “historical peoples” and also with respect to Khomiakov - 
‘genuine education’ is “available only for those countries, the inner composition of which is 
based on unity of tribal and mental elements”, while he meant that the development of society 
is dependent on spontaneous vital principles ‘inherent in the whole body’ inherent in 
individuals, thus the recovery of western society could be “a result of immediate borrowing of 
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Slavic principles.”48 At this point is important to memorize components of Slavophiles 
identity as Orthodoxy, special, unique role, traditions or collectivism. 
2.1.2 Westernizers 
It is taken that this debate between Westernizers and Slavophiles started to be more vigorous 
after the moment when Pyotr Chaadayev has published his Philosophical Letters where he 
criticized Russia’s development. Chaadayev’s criticism was aimed mainly on the isolated 
status of Russia from the western world and on Russia’s small contribution towards progress 
of civilization, whilst he was trying to encourage the Russian intelligentsia to become more 
active. Firstly, Chaadayev’s intentions were sentenced to failure and he was sent to madhouse, 
but gradually enlightened principles together with public participation were part of Great 
Reforms in which Russia has conceded essential principles of western society as expanded 
educational access, free labor supply or independent judiciary49. Among the most influential 
members of Westernizers were for example Alexander Gerzen or Vissarion Belinsky. 
Contrary to Slavophiles which stressed the difference of Russian society from European, 
Westernizers assumed that specific features of Russian society could fit with the European 
model of development, but on the same hand it is necessary “to be Russians in European 
way.50” 
Russia’s search for national identity in order to catch up modernization process in 18th and 
19th century can be perceived to some extent as a conflict among intelligentsia between 
modern and traditional society, or between the reality and ideal assumptions. To sum up first 
identity crisis in Russian history between Slavophiles and Westernizers it is important to 
mention also common motivation behind nationalist excitement which was spreading 
throughout Europe and Russia as well. Nationalism (narodnost) played significant role mainly 
for Slavophiles by promoting of Russian uniqueness and traditions in order to differentiate 
from the West. According to Rabow-Edling, the socio-psychological function of Slavophilism 
is indicating importance of cultural nationalism not just for possible political action, but as for 
a way from identity crisis as well, thus “cultural nationalism acts as a promoter of national 
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consciousness in the sense of a public identity separated from state.51” Issue of nationality was 
stressed also by official doctrine promoted by Nicholas I what was influenced by rebellion in 
Russian Kingdom of Poland. In wake of these events, tsar has adopted doctrine of 
“Orthodoxy, Autocracy and Nationality”, this doctrine was significant for Russian identity 
formation in the past and in following periods as well. Philosophical heritage of both 
intellectual camps were later excluded from public discourse during the Soviet Union, but 
their ideas from  liberal, religious, conservative or idealist political spectrum were providing 
important background for reinterpretation of Russian identity in post-Soviet period.52 
2.1.3 Eurasianism 
Another impact in formation of Russian identity later in 20th century was development of 
Eurasianist’s concept during the 1920s. Beginnings of Eurasianist’s ideas could be observed 
in the outlines of Russia’s focus on keeping Eastward expansion in Central Asia in the late of 
19th century. Russia’s Imperial Orientalism was to some extent product of Slavophile’s 
preoccupation among intellectuals in society connected with the idea of strengthening eastern 
learning in order to counterbalance the influence of western domination. According to Sanjay 
Kumar Pandey (2007) importance of colonialism in Asia for Russia’s sense of self-identity 
does not consisted in its alternative to Europe, but rather it was in Asia where Russia found its 
‘Europeaness’, what is Pandey further adding with Dostoevsky’s admitting “In Europe we are 
hangers on and slaves, but in Asia we are masters, In Europe we are Tatars, but in Asia we 
too are Europeans.53” Another source of inspiration for Eurasianists can be observed in more 
“radical” part of Slavophiles labeling themselves as the “Easterners” (Vostochniki). 
Easterners were proposing to fulfill Russia’s holy mission in the Far East Asia with different 
perspectives on assimilation between Russian, Chinese and Turanian races, while some of 
them were against so called “Yellow Peril” and some of them were favoring “Yellow Russia”. 
Another point of Easterners in search of Asian connection can be traced in understanding of 
Scythians as predecessors of Russian people coming from Asia. Mentioned elements of Asian 
legacy in defining of Russian identity had significant impact on evolution of Eurasianism 
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(Evraziistvo) as a political movement with specific features. Among the most influential 
proponents for beginning of Eurasianism and of its foundation was Prince Nikolai Trubetskoy 
and Russian geographer and economist P.N. Savitsky. According to Trubetskoy’s “Evropa i 
chelovechestvo”, there is no reason for Russia to employ Romano-Germanic values which is 
Europe considering as universal and higher than others, instead he is proposing alternatives 
against Europeanization in concepts of Panslavism or “Panmongolianism.54” Trubetskoy’s 
book altogether with radical anti-Westernism was among the main desires for Eurasianism.    
Their main idea was that Russia does not eminently belongs neither to European society nor 
to Asian one, but it belongs rather to clearly unique, original Eurasian ethnic community. 
Regarding to Eurasianism this geographically stipulated condition makes Russian culture, 
statehood and its identity influenced by both Asian and European features different from the 
Western one, thus Russia’s political orientation got specific values.  
 Important aspect of Eurasianism in order to establish new concept of Russian nation was also 
their new interpretation of Russian history. Main points of their reinterpretation of the history 
was their raising attention to historical periods before Peter the Great, namely to Genghis 
Khan Empire. They insisted that Muscovite state was the continuation of Genghis Khan 
Empire stretching from the Ukraine and Belarus to Siberia, while subjugated Tatars under 
Genghis Khan were important part of the Muscovite state and its education.55 This helped 
Eurasians to support their opinion on peculiarities about Russian ethnicity and culture, 
explaining that Russians are neither Slavs nor Turanians, but rather they are part of a long 
process of influence of various ethnic groups among themselves. On the other hand, such 
belief on Russian ethnicity brought inconsistency towards the issue of Orthodoxy making it 
the weakest place in the Eurasianists doctrine. Realizing the multiethnic background of 
Russian or Eurasian nationality, it is important to take into account its religious diversity.  
Such construction of identity (nationality) and interpretation of history serves for Eurasians as 
a background in formation of their ideology. Their leading idea was intertwined with the 
historical mission of Russia before and Eurasianist’s political platform was summarized into 
the notion of ideocracy, insisting on their beliefs that ideocracy will be the structure of future. 
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With respect to establishment of Soviet Russia it was the first modern ideocracy according to 
Eurasianists, however, Soviet rule altogether with politicization and ideologization led to the 
split of Eurasians into two camps-one represented by Savitskii, Ilin and Trubetskoy, anti-
Bolshevik one; and second pro-Bolshevik associated with Karsavin, Efron or Sviatopolk-
Mirskii.56 
2.1.4 Identity Discourse during Soviet Period 
After the seizing of power by Bolsheviks, there was no place for Russian identity in 
Communist ideology as the Soviet nation-building project was more oriented on recognition 
of rights and separating identities of Russia’s ethnic groups.57 Nevertheless, at the same time 
when the Soviet regime was separating identities of ethnic groups, it was also providing 
unifying concept in order to merge all people of Soviet Union together in Soviet patriotism. 
Following the period of de-Stalinization and subverting the official Marxist-Leninist ideology 
by Nikita Khrushchev, Russian citizens turned to traditional patterns of religious and national 
identity with regards to samizdat literature by reviewing the Slavophiles and Westernizers 
altogether with Russia’s place in the world history.58 This process of de-Stalinization was also 
influential on formation of Russian nationalism among politicians and intellectuals thanks to 
Khrushchev’s policies mainly in religion and agriculture. Main issues among Russian 
nationalist movement were the search for new political ideals as well reinvention of the 
Russian national identity.59 In reaffirming of new Russian identity, nationalists were debating 
about the Asian influence on evolution of Russian nation. Debate was extensive mainly on the 
issue of Genghis Khan and the role of Turkic cultures before the Mongol invasion. Pandey 
(2007) is mentioning different Russian nationalist authors which are describing various 
consequences from Mongol invasion in fourteen century and also its implications towards the 
relation between Russia and West. Authors differ in opinions like Mongol invasion was the 
main reason of Russia’s backwardness towards West due to destroyed productive forces 
(Narochnitsky 1980), other claims that Russia saved Europe from plunder of Mongol Horde, 
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thus served as a shield of West (Kuznetsov 1980).60 Analyzing historical period under the 
influence of Genghis Khan Empire allowed Russian nationalists to utilize their ideas and 
become more known among the society mainly due to the 600th anniversary of Battle of 
Kulikovo in 1980. Nationalist intellectuals insisted that by victory of Russians in this battle 
Russia has acquired its spiritual self-identity and as since this battle Mongols started to lose its 
influence, while the Muscovy as predecessor of Russian Empire started to rise, role of 
Orthodoxy is for Russia’s identity essential in revitalization of its society. Doing so, Russian 
intellectuals started to underline the role of Orthodoxy in Russia’s identity and its history, thus 
Orthodoxy should replace Communist ideology. 
2.1.5 Post-Soviet Identity Formation 
Split of the Soviet Union has brought emergence of newly independent countries altogether 
with new geopolitical situation in the world. In these regards, newly occurred Russian 
Federation started to find its orientation and role in newly created international order with 
focus on its foreign policy, later mainly in the Post-Soviet space. Nevertheless, debates about 
Russian foreign policy among politicians were closely interlinked also with debates about 
new Russian identity. Perceptions on identity in Post-Soviet Russia among politicians were 
influenced by consistency of ideological values and psychological belief system; furthermore 
different concepts of identity were dependent on political needs of each group of politicians.61 
According to Chafetz (1996), there were three separated groups of politicians which were 
capable to shape Russian foreign policy. Their beliefs were shaped by their distinct opinions 
about the nature of international environment and different approaches towards Russian 
identity. First group consisted of liberal views on world politics stressing that it is highly 
institutionalized and interdependent. This group of politicians also known as ‘Liberal 
Internationalists’ or ‘Atlanticists’ was inclining towards Europe and identified Russia with 
democratic, modern states believing in free market economy, united by the then Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of Russia Andrei Kozyrev and President Boris Yeltsin. With regards to 
democratic principles, European sympathies and describing the West as a natural ally, their 
inspiration by Westernizers of 19th century is more than evident. Second group consisted of 
politicians who were permanently opposing ‘Atlanticists’ and insisting that international 
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politics works under the Hobbesian conditions of war all against all. Their ideas about 
political system were shifting them towards authoritarianism, while their ideologies divided 
this group into communists and authoritarian chauvinists. Group of nationalists united by 
Zhirinovsky and communists led by Zyuganov possessed common antipathy towards 
capitalism, liberalism and Western model of democracy; nevertheless they were advocating 
authoritarian government and attempts of resurrection of Russian Empire or Soviet Union at 
least. However, this group was ideologically divided and they did not represented any 
coherent concept of Russian identity, nonetheless their common opposition towards at that 
time liberal government in charge represented some elements of Slavophilism or Panslavism 
respectively.  Their hostility towards Western liberalism’s focus on individuality instead of 
collective values recalled debates of Westernizers and Slavophiles again. The third group 
across the Post-Soviet political spectrum was represented by the statists. Political stance of 
this group was somewhere in the middle of the previously mentioned groups, though their 
perception of Russian identity with regards to history was confirming the one introduced by 
the Slavophiles much more than liberal did.62 
    Since 1996 it is possible to notice shift in Russian foreign policy and its identity. With the 
admission of Yevgeni Primakov as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, change from the Western-
Oriented to Eurasian-oriented policy started to become evident. Primakov’s understanding of 
Russia as a great power led him to tailor Russia’s foreign policy with emphasis to the Post-
Soviet space and to confirm the role of Russia in this region altogether with Russia’s 
identification towards the rest of Asia, thus recognizing with Eurasian identity. Significance 
towards geopolitics, rather than to political cultural or philosophical ideology was the shift or 
difference of neo-Eurasianism63 from classical Eurasianism presented by intellectuals in the 
early 20th century. Rather than perceiving of Eurasianism as a substitution for Russian identity 
in sociological or cultural terms, strategy of Eurasianism adopted by Primakov in 1996 served 
somewhat as a confirmation and justification of Russia’s status of a Great Power in this 
region. According to various approaches of implementation and purposes of Eurasianism, it is 
taken that there are at least three different interpretations of this concept. With respect to 
Paradorn Rangsimaporn (2006), a key of balanced foreign policy concept under Yeltsin and 
                                                          
62 Chafetz G. The Struggle for a National Identity in Post-Soviet Russia. Political Science Quarterly (Academy of 
Political Science), Vol. 111, # 4, 1996. P. 673 
63 Pandey S. K. Asia in the Debate on Russian Identity. International Studies, Vol. 44, # 4, 2007. P. 332 
 40 
 
Putin’s first presidential term which was justifying Russia’s interests both in Asia and west is 
described as Pragmatic Eurasianism, more evident in rhetoric than in practice.64 Second 
interpretation of Eurasianism as a neo-Eurasianism was considered by some nationalist 
oriented and anti-Western part of political officials as a national ideology, while its main 
characteristics lied in reorientation of Russia’s alliance and foreign policy from the West and 
to ally with other powers in order to counterbalance the global power of USA. Strictly 
instrumentalist, geopolitical approach of Neo-Eurasianism serves also as an “decoy” for Asian 
countries to attract them as allies with Russia in the East and further contrast the dominance 
of the West. The last, Intercivilisational Eurasianism interpretation focused on 
implementation of Russia’s geographical position on unifying of the Asian-Pacific economy 
with the European and fulfilling so Russia’s ‘intercivilisational’ potential between two 
continents.65 This approach towards Eurasianism was responsible for development of 
economic partnership and integration of Russia in Asia, and for its strategic and political 
relations as well.          
Implementation of Eurasian identity into Russia’s foreign policy since the 1996 served clearly 
as a pragmatic and instrumentalist approach in order to maintain its influence in region an 
gain as much benefits from it as possible. This pragmatic path served during presidential term 
of Yeltsin and to some extent to Putin during his two terms; however Russian identity during 
Putin’s period was not strictly Eurasian. Russian identity through the first two presidential 
terms of Vladimir Putin was rather ambiguous; unclear what is reflecting lack of attention 
towards the concepts of Russian identity. According to Tsygankov (2007), Westernisers 
represents opposition of Russian identity towards Eurasianists on the different spectrum of the 
‘poles’ since and across their historical introduction, thus their ideas are radically different, 
while Putin’s perception of Russia as being “normal great power” is melting right among 
these ‘poles’.66 During his first presidential terms, Putin insisted that Russia is sharing same 
basic democratic principles as the nations of Western Europe, but on the other hand the form 
of government must be unique and capable with traditions of the nation, thus preserving its 
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distinctive identity.67 Such ambiguity and inconsistency in identity allowed him to maintain 
the flexibility of action in foreign and domestic politics, but on the other side it has brought 
issues regarding to Russian identity in the future, and showed that insufficient attention to 
identity can have negative impact in creating a social or political agenda. 
It is possible to observe that historical development of Russian identity and its crisis has 
brought periodically almost similar repeating of concerns as what is the place and role of 
Russia in the world and where Russia does belongs to. These concerns were putting a 
question whether Russia should follow the Western path of development or country has rather 
maintain its own vector of progress according to its geographic orientation, values, traditions, 
culture or religion. What was in common during this evolution since the 18th century is a fact 
that Russia was managing its identity always in relation to Europe or West as its significant 
‘other’. However, not only because of its geographical location, Russian identity was 
seriously influenced by both, Europe and Asia in particular points as political reforms, 
culture, education or language to different extent, undoubtedly. Europe can serve as 
influential point of reference to Russian identity taking into account that it was the process of 
Westernization of Russian Empire during the Peter the Great’s period which initiated the 
debates and crisis of country’s identity, as well it was competition with West in Asian region 
in conquering its territories rather than vice-versa, however, we can doubt about Russian 
military expeditions in Eastern Balkans whether it was competition against Asian (Ottoman) 
influence in regards to Slavic patriotism or it was struggle in order to prevent a possible 
further influence and intervention of West in this region, one way or other, same, traditional 
elements of Slavophiles were in this action present, for instance Orthodoxy or Slavic unity. 
Nevertheless, significant part of intellectuals were not satisfied with the formulation of 
Western values in discourse of identity and turned towards Orthodox community as 
Slavophiles, another part of intelligentsia turned later towards Asia as Eurasians, while in 
following period there was no space for identity with respect to Marxist-Leninist ideology. 
Nationalist movements during Gorbachev era started to re-open the issues concerning Russian 
identity what could contributed to some extent into split of USSR. Immediate Post-Soviet 
inconsistency of identity firstly tried to integrate Russia into the western community and its 
unsuccess continued with the ideas of new Eurasianism. Period of Putin’s two terms was 
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influenced by ambiguous, inconsistent perception of identity, mixing the elements of 
traditional Slavophile conceptions with Westernism and Eurasianism. Notwithstanding, it is 
possible to perceive new Eurasianism as the latest development of Russian identity until the 
period which was analyzed in this paragraph that is until 2008. However, its features as a 
cooperation in Asia and reasserting Russia’s status as a Great Power could be recognized also 
in contemporary, but still, one should realize very utilitarian or instrumental essence of such 
Eurasianism which is having artificial elements of identity with regards to huge economic 
intentions of such concept, or project better say. However, next stages of this paper will 
unveil the most recent development and opinions according to Russian identity, while one 
should keep in mind components of single conceptions of identity mentioned in this chapter. 
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Chapter 3: Construction of Russian Identity during Presidential Term of Dmitry 
Medvedev 2010-2012 
One can doubt about the years that are in title of this chapter as the presidency of Dmitry 
Medvedev started in 2008. Yet, the years in title are having specific meaning that meant shift 
in Russian identity construction what would be analyzed further, and thus it fits better to aim 
as well to title of the whole thesis. 
Inauguration of Dmitry Medvedev into presidential office was accompanied by ceremony and 
oath after which he has expressed strategy and goals that he would like to achieve. He 
emphasized particular importance on the fundamental role of law, nevertheless, among the 
other goals were planned achievements in the sphere of agriculture, economic development by 
supporting of entrepreneurship and fighting corruption, Russia’s influence on international 
community, making country more open to the world and what is important for the topic of 
identity to some extent were his plans in continuing cooperation between country’s different 
religious faiths, social and ethnic groups in order to strengthen peace and harmony in “our 
(Russian) common home.”68 However, title of this paragraph is indicating the period for 
analysis since 2010, there should be no doubts that among the most significant event during 
the presidential term of Dmitry Medvedev with regards to international relations and global 
impact was the armed conflict in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in August 2008. It is important 
to mention it because this conflict had specific implications also on Russia’s identity 
construction in following years. 
3.1 Russkiy Mir, South Ossetia and Abkhazia Conflict in 2008 as a Background for 
Russian Identity Construction 
Following paragraphs are making reference to conflict in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in order 
to analyze its influence on further dynamic of Russian identity construction. It depends on the 
perspective that is used in analysis of this conflict, while this research assumes that this 
conflict served as “generator” for realizing that Russian identity needs more attention because 
this event has proved its decline. Whether was further Russian action in this conflict 
performed to “hold back” its identity that was falling down from reef, or whether was this 
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action part of planned events for reconstruction of Russian identity is hard to prove, but fact 
that this conflict played role in Russian identity is evident. 
3.1.1 Russkiy Mir 
Development of Russkiy Mir Foundation was significant decision for designing of Russian 
foreign policy as well for further implications stemming from such establishment towards 
Russian identity construction. Decree on creating of this foundation was signed by then 
President Vladimir Putin in 2007 for the official purpose “to promote the Russian language, as 
Russia’s national heritage and significant aspect of Russian world and culture, and supporting 
Russian language programs abroad.”69 Foundation is a source of Russian soft power policy, 
projected by Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Education while its 
funding is realized by public and private funds. Social factor as one of the main aims of this 
foundation and potential doctrine to some extent is crucial in realizing priority assignments in 
Russian foreign policy in the shadow of country’s identity formation.  
3.1.2 Abkhazia and South Ossetia Conflict 2008  
Since the dissolution of Soviet Union in 1991, Russia was struggling with sovereignty issues 
in Caucasus region several times. Firstly, these sovereignty problems were concerning the 
region of Chechnya in 1994 to 1996. Conflict started by declaration of independence of 
Chechen Republic of Ichkeria from Russia due to its dissatisfaction with the new Russian 
Federation Treaty. Following military operation for the purpose of “restoring constitutional 
order” in region necessitated in many casualties, submitting ceasefire in 1996 and signing the 
Peace Treaty and Principles of Interrelation between Russian Federation and Chechen 
Republic of Ichkeria in Moscow, 1997. Second Chechen war due to invasion into Dagestan by 
Chechen militants and several bombings on Russian territory, commenced in 1999 until 2000, 
and with the insurgence until 2009 resulted into establishment of pro-Russian government 
over the territory of Chechnya. Mentioning Chechen cases to the context of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia case is only illustrational, and serves for the purpose of understanding how 
differently was framed the nature of ethnic and national identity by Russian government. 
While the first Chechen war framed separatist claims, second conflict in Chechnya during 
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Putin’s administration framed separatist requirements in connection with religious and 
national extremism, terrorism and national security issues, while in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia was the main cause need of “liberalization.”70 
Following the day after initiation of conflict in South Ossetia, Dmitry Medvedev issued a 
statement with respect to situation in the region on 8th of August. Among the others, he 
declared that “as the President of the Russian Federation it is his duty to protect the lives and 
dignity of Russian citizens wherever they may be”, as well that “Russia has historically been 
a guarantor for the security of the peoples of Caucasus, and this remains true today.”71 Such 
statement was emphasized with the message that the perpetrators will be punished, while 
pointing on the Georgian “aggressors”. From president’s statement it is possible to presuppose 
that Medvedev was paying attention to some extent towards both, historical and ethnic 
construction of Russian identity. If this conflict was not escalated or directed under Russia’s 
scenario by “covert actions” as it was presented by some western medias72, it is possible to 
assume that due to circumstances which occurred in Ossetia and Abkhazia, Medvedev started 
to introduce, perform and legitimize the concept of Russian identity as a reaction on the 
situation that has occurred. Nevertheless, on the eve of conflict, majority of citizens in 
concerned region possessed the passports of Russian Federation thanks to the interesting 
opportunity as it was possible of doing as easily as until 2002, while people were refusing to 
obtain Georgian citizenship what has influenced and justified Medvedev’s decisions 
reinforced also by policy of Russkiy Mir Foundation. During the meeting with leaders of 
parties represented in Russian Parliament, several days after the escalation of conflict in 
Northern Caucasus, Dmitry Medvedev has except the description of situation in region also 
repeated that it is Russia’s historical mission and duty to preserve security for people living in 
Caucasus and also that “Russia will not leave its fellow citizens in misfortune.”73 Furthermore, 
during the meeting with servicemen from the Russian Armed Forces Medvedev stated that the 
people of South Ossetia have survived a genocide thanks to inevitable and justified actions 
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taken as the direct duty of Russian state, performed by armed forces in order to defend the 
interests of Russia, while he was “confident that you (soldiers) will continue to protect the 
lives and interests of Russian citizens, and to carry out (your) civilian, military and human 
duties.”74 Two years after this conflict, during his meeting with President of South Ossetia 
Eduard Kokoity, Dmitry Medvedev said that the recognition of independence of two countries 
was the right one, and it has given these citizens opportunity to develop without fear of 
extermination and genocide.75 
For illustration of the feelings of Russian citizens and their identification with political action 
taken by representatives of Russia, it is significant to mention their view on this topic. 
According to the Analytical Center of Yuri Levada poll conducted on 1600 Russian 
respondents in 48 regions of Russia in September 2008, Russian public opinion generally 
supports the course of government actions in Caucasus.76  
From such statements which were emphasizing the historical role, duties and citizens it is 
evident that ethnic and national discourse in terms of identity has played significant role in 
assessment of political action since the beginning of Medvedev’s presidential term. 
Interestingly, assuming Russia’s recognition of independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
after conflict, and six months before Kremlin’s immediate reaction on independence of 
Kosovo as a possible precedent for independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia at the same 
time non-acceptance of independence of Kosovo by describing it as a “special case” in 
international law is bringing the issue of Russia’s identity even on a higher stake. Main 
purpose of this paragraph was to illustrate which event can serve as a background on realizing 
of definite re-construction of Russian identity or since when it is possible to observe shift in 
identity formation, thus taking the legalistically framed defense of Russian citizens (Russkii) 
living in separatist regions of Georgia (or anywhere abroad) as a starting point influential in 
analysis of Russian identity construction. 
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3.2 Russian Identity Construction in 2010-2012 
At his speech during the first Meeting of Council for Civil Society Institutions and Human 
Rights on May 2010, Medvedev stressed the importance of discussion about the fundamental 
right to life, underlying that mainly people of North Caucasus but also people throughout the 
Russia are under the threat and attacks of terrorists and armed gangs. He assumed that this 
situation mainly in Caucasus is stemming from complex problems as a corruption, 
unemployment and lack of mutual respect between the ethnic groups while Medvedev 
stressed that “we are all one people and we must live in peace together.”77 It was another time 
after the military operation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia when the topic of Northern 
Caucasus in the context of identity concern was assessed. During this meeting, council has 
agreed that people of Caucasus needs to be integrated as proper members of Russian society 
and in order to achieve this, Medvedev presented that the creation of full-fledged Russian 
identity is necessary, otherwise Russia will face “very dire fate.” However, Medvedev has 
already started some policies of identity in Caucasus before, he has never officially linked 
them namely to identity nevertheless the link was evident, this time he declared that Russia’s 
identity redefinition is necessary. Similar tendencies in restoration of important aspects for 
Russia’s existence and its interaction with international community is possible to observe 
during  Medvedev’s term also in improving of relations with USA according to New START 
treaty in the same year or application to WTO.  
It is important to mention that these new trends altogether with new identity formation in 
Russia can be traced and connected to Medvedev’s article called Go Russia!, issued in 
September 2009 where he promoted historical role of Russia and its future as well 
modernization program for Russia mainly in scientific regards.78 This article can be taken as 
possible template of his policy as well as identity argument in the next years. 
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3.2.1 Religious Component of Russian Identity 
Stressing the historical role of Russia, Medvedev has understood the position of Orthodox 
Church in it as well its connection to Russian identity formation. Several meetings of 
President or Prime Minister of Russian Federation with Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All 
Russia were indicating continuation or even improvement in these relations. One of 
interesting Medvedev’s policies in this respect was for instance setting a new memorable date 
in Russia’s calendar – Baptism of Rus Day on July of 28th79. Giving the importance for this 
day officially and legally on federative level and not only among the Orthodox religious 
people makes legislative and general identification of Russia to Orthodoxy and its historical 
role towards Russia’s development, due to fact that this day is symbolizing a memory to 
Grand Prince Vladimir, Baptizer of Kievan Rus. Additionally, this decision was influential 
also for strengthening of Russian statehood as well for social, spiritual or cultural 
development of Russian citizens. Similar identity politics towards Orthodox Church during 
Medvedev’s administration is evident in issuing of executive order on celebration of 700th 
birth anniversary of spiritual leader and reformer of monarchism in Russia, Saint Sergius of 
Radonezh aimed for strengthening of spiritual unity of the Russian citizens. 
In identity context, this step should be taken relevantly considering the concept of Slavophiles 
and the role of Orthodoxy in it with respect to their opinion on Russian identity as something 
on its own way of development, different from the Western one, in religious questions as 
well.  
It is possible to observe that ethnic element of Russian identity construction in this period is 
strengthened also with religious component. Medvedev was aware that Orthodox Church as 
leading religion in country can serve not only to utilitarian purposes for identity development 
in promotion of ethnic and religious harmony in country but as well it can be useful for 
achieving foreign policies with regards to compatriots and the role of Church in it as a source 
of unification.  
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3.2.2 Role of Great Patriotic War in Russian Identity 
It is well known that the 9th of May is one of the most important holidays in Russia as well its 
celebration of victory in the Great Patriotic War (World War II) is definitely the most 
prestigious and biggest among the former allies in conflict. USSR as the main contributor of 
peace in Europe by defeating Nazi Germany for the price of huge casualties has honored its 
loses and heroes by establishing lots of monuments, statues and memorials across its territory 
as one of the elements of proud, glory and memento of eternal memory for further 
generations. Russian Federation as internationally recognized successor state to the former 
USSR continued on building its importance to the victory in horrible conflict and stressing the 
significance of USSR, and mainly Russia’s role during the war as well stimulated 
consciousness among the citizens in order to identify them with its relevance in Russian 
history also during the presidential term of Dmitry Medvedev. In order to strengthen the 
awareness of Russia’s importance during the conflict and bridging its relevance to 
contemporary issues, Medvedev’s administration has done various more or less symbolic 
decisions or actions which are having its place in context of identity construction. Among the 
traditional annual celebrations on 9th of May, Medvedev has also conferred the titles City of 
Military Glory to various cities what is somehow an extension or substitution of similar to 
USSR Hero City title which was given to cities due to their importance, courage and heroism 
during the Great Patriotic War. Interesting was also holding the anniversary of 25th EU-Russia 
summit, 2010 in Rostov-on-Don, at that time recently awarded City of Military Glory. As 
Medvedev stated that choice was to great extent symbolic as Rostov went during war through 
hardships and endurances, what is “symbol of our good relations.”80 Significant element for 
realizing the role of Great Patriotic War in Russian identity and its role in politics was speech 
of then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin during the foundation stone ceremony for the We 
Fought Together Against Nazism monument. Putin has presented monument to faith, sacrifice 
and courage of military brotherhood of people of different nationalities against Nazism 
mentioning that the victory in war was primarily the victory of the Soviet soldier, while 
condemned the destruction of the Monument of Military Honor in Kutaisi, Georgia previous 
December. In this regards he continued that: “Our duty is to preserve and defend historical 
truth, defend the honor, dignity and good name of the living and fallen heroes. We will use 
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everything in our power to do this: politics, law, mass media, the power of civil society and 
Russia’s prestige and influence in the world.”81 From this speech it is evident that among the 
role of Great Patriotic War, considering the “Soviet soldier” victory and government’s willing 
to use necessary tools to defend memory in any of Post-Soviet countries - the element of 
Soviet Union is also important in Russia’s government identity construction. The role of such 
identity in international settings was confirmed by adoption of Russian draft by UN General 
Assembly on disapproving of destroying monuments to the fighters against Nazism. 
Furthermore, during review of the year 2010, a live television show speech, Medvedev has 
placed 65th anniversary of Victory in Great Patriotic War among the year’s biggest events and 
greatest challenges. He has assumed that it is very special date for Russians that shapes “our 
identity as Russian citizens and that makes us modern individuals, but does not let us forget 
our past.82” 
 3.2.3 Eurasian Conception of Russian Identity 
Russia’s integration into Eurasian region started at beginning of Putin’s first presidential term. 
This integration starting mainly in economic terms was followed by particular countries of 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) creating the Eurasian Economic Community 
(EAEC) in 2000. During Medvedev’s presidential term there were several meetings of leaders 
of member countries, but the most important development in this area was establishment of 
the Eurasian Customs Union (EACU) between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, effective 
since January 2010. This integration removed all customs borders between participant 
countries and brought them closer to planned, more extensive economic integration in future 
by proposed founding of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) which later came into 
existence. According to fact that this union is aimed only on one sector of cooperation which 
is economy, decision of such arrangement is perceived through the pragmatic reasons on the 
first sight rather than through the identity search. However, as the identity presupposes the 
interests, which definitely are present in case of Russia towards Post-Soviet countries that 
were the members of EAEU at that time, identity component and its formation in Medvedev’s 
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administration towards Eurasia cannot be oversight. This view on Eurasian factor of Russian 
identity is strengthened by Soviet past or its memory further emphasized by previously 
mentioned element of Great Patriotic War and Russky Mir conception and its relation towards 
Post-Soviet space as well.  
Nevertheless, assuming Eurasian promotion of Russian identity during Medvedev’s term is on 
the one hand reinforced by analyzing Russian rather small cooperation with the EU while his 
administration was contrariwise making its own integration in the Eurasia, on the other hand it 
is colliding with strictly Eurasian perception according to Medvedev’s visit to G-20 meeting 
in 2010 where he declared to Western journalists that even though Russia is not member of 
EU, it is European country as well European nation.83 This collision was even deepened by 
Russia’s preparation to cancel visa regime with the EU in the same year, however it not found 
support among some European countries. Such vector in Russia’s policy by searching of 
balance between the East and West can serve as indicator in the identity search by reviewing 
possible benefits. Despite the fact of pragmatic essence of Eurasian Economic Union, such 
political orientations still can serve as intentionally demonstrated evaluation of Russia‘s 
identity construction under Medvedev’s administration. 
 
3.2.4 Compatriots Living Abroad 
Compatriots living abroad are the most important part of previously mentioned “doctrine” of 
Russky Mir established by Putin in 2007 and represents Russian speaking people, fellow 
countrymen in the countries of the former USSR, keeping in touch with their historical 
homeland. Support for compatriots on governmental level is secured by Government 
Commission on Compatriots Living Abroad, established in 2007 in order to ensure 
coordinated action in pursuing the state policy towards Russians living in other countries. For 
purpose of defending and supporting compatriots, Medvedev’s administration established in 
2008 the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of the Independent States, Compatriots 
Living Abroad and the International Humanitarian Cooperation, called Rossotrudnichestvo. 
This agency operates under the jurisdiction of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and implements 
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state policy of international humanitarian cooperation as well promotes objective image of 
contemporary Russia abroad. Rossotrudnichestvo also provides assistance in protection of 
human rights as well it supports the linguistic, cultural and religious needs of Russian 
community abroad and by doing so strengthening their links with their historical 
“Motherland.”84 In contemporary, it operates in 80 countries while there is long-term project 
aimed on opening more representations by 2020. 
Another development towards this policy during Medvedev’s presidency was made by 
Amendments to the Federal Law on Russian Federation’s State Policy towards Compatriots 
living Abroad85. This Federal Law clarified recognition of compatriots based on the principle 
of self-identification and excludes requirements for issuing on behalf of Russian Federation of 
certificates confirming that person is identified as a compatriot. In addition it also clarified 
objectives of state policy towards compatriots as well it defined that voluntary relocation of 
compatriot to Russia has to be provided with accordance to a relevant state program. This 
amendment has strengthened and developed ties between compatriots and their “Motherland” 
and was also influential for future foreign policy of Russian Federation mainly in the CIS 
(Commonwealth of Independent States) countries. For the purpose of efficiency and 
implementation of compatriot policy there was World Conference of Compatriots named The 
Contribution by Compatriots to Russia’s Modernization held in Moscow in 2010 during 
which were introduced ideas with respect to Russia’s innovation by academics and 
professionals from 70 countries. Russian compatriot policy during presidency of Dmitry 
Medvedev was progressing in 2011 by his signing Executive Order on Establishing a 
Foundation for Supporting and Protecting the Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad.86 Its 
development was taken by Ministry of Foreign Affairs altogether with Rossotrudnichestvo in 
order to provide necessary support of protection of compatriot’s rights and interests in their 
particular countries, funded mainly by federal budget as well by voluntary contributions. 
Practical implementation of such policy could be observed on February, 2012 by Medvedev’s 
signing of Federal Law on Ratification of Agreement between the Russian Federation and the 
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Republic of Estonia on Cooperation in Pension Provision.87 This has established the outline 
for rights to pensions by citizens of Russian Federation, Republic of Estonia or people without 
citizenship located in these states.   
 The role of Russian identity construction in context of compatriots living abroad is 
significant. Firstly, this policy is aimed on preserving ethnic identity of Russia abroad and 
also is determining or influencing the Russian foreign policy with respect to specific countries 
in Post-Soviet, Eurasian region due to its identity orientation. The fact that foreign policy 
towards Post-Soviet countries altogether with protection of rights of compatriots living abroad 
were the main priorities of Russian Federation are confirming the words of Dmitry Medvedev 
during the working meeting with Konstantin Kosachev in 2012, newly appointed director of 
Rossotrudnichestvo. Medvedev stated that “Relations with CIS countries have always been 
one of the Russian Federation’s top priorities” and that the “…protect the rights of our 
compatriots living abroad - another of our foreign policies priorities…88” 
Secondly, policy of compatriots living abroad serves as a pretext and it confirms gradual 
construction of Russian identity unofficially established on the backgrounds of North-
Caucasian conflict in 2008 by defending of Russian people and confirmed official identity 
construction by Medvedev’s speech in 2010 mentioned previously. However, at this stage it 
was not known how weak is the Russian ethnic identity within the Russian borders and what 
role in it can be performed by nationalism. 
3.2.5 Nationalism, ethnicity and Russian Identity Construction 
With the beginning of December 2010, series of nationalist demonstrations, violent protests, 
ethnic brawls, mass arrests and other similar events has took place across the Russian 
Federation. Main trigger for such events was conflict between Russian soccer fans and North 
Caucasian young people in Moscow which has resulted in death of one of the Russian soccer 
fan. It is possible to predict and to assume that such event in multiethnic country like Russia 
will bring something like a “social crisis” that wakes up the spirit of nationalism. Thereafter, 
it has provoked many nationalists as well neo-Nazi demonstrators to organize several massive 
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gatherings and violent clashes against Russian policeman throughout the various cities of 
Russia. These events have shown up that Russia’s policy towards ethnic relations inside the 
country is weak as well that nation-building efforts are not sufficient; consequently, Russia’s 
ethnic identity is not coherent. Furthermore, realizing that regions of Northern Caucasus were 
the objects against which were the protests aimed, it has presented to some extent that 
separatist tendencies were still possible issue of the country.  
In his reaction with respect to most violent gathering with clashes between police and 
protesters on Manezhnaya square Medvedev has stressed that riots as such will be “crack 
down” hardly and “vandals” which participated in these action must be imprisoned. He 
continued that “responsibility must come indifferently regardless to where it takes place or 
regardless to permanent place of residence of offender, no matter if he is Muscovite or citizen 
of other places of Russia even Southern or Northern places”, while at the end he stressed that 
ignition of riots based on nationality differences is serious crime in Russian Federation that 
can occur in other countries, but not in Russia.89 This has promoted that Medvedev’s 
government will fight against such “ethnical cleavage” strictly; additionally, nationalist 
tendencies inside the country had utilitarian purposes for his administration as well in 
meanings of performing the multiethnic Russian identity construction. With regards to 
multiethnic identity, several days after the spread of nationalism in the country, Medvedev in 
his New Year’s Address to Nation stated among the others that Russia is the country which 
“cherishes its multiethnic traditions.”90 
Another interesting point of systematic utilization of expanding Russian nationalism as a tool 
for political legitimization of further actions on the one hand and stopping nationalism in 
order to prevent possible (nationalistic) competition in government and possible secessionist 
ambitions on the other hand, Medvedev has opened the issues of education in this context. For 
this purpose during the Meeting of the State Council Presidium on Measures to Strengthen 
Interethnic Harmony in Russian Society,91 Dmitry Medvedev mentioned that “work on 
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interethnic harmony and communication between cultures should begin in our schools and 
universities…”, he continued that the quality of civic education in Russian education system 
needs to be examined, concluding that “we need to take a close look at textbooks” content 
and at teaching methods”. In these regards, noticing the flags of Bashkir military forces 
fighting against Napoleon or against Nazi army, Medvedev suggested that influential 
personalities of country’s different people should be constantly mentioned and he repeated 
that “our (Russia’s) major challenge is to forge a future national identity…our task is to 
create a full-fledged Russian nation while preserving identity of all the peoples inhabiting our 
country.”92 Additionally, Medvedev expressed his hope believing that each federal subject of 
Russia will give priority to preservation of interethnic unity, assuming that “there can be no 
state without interethnic unity”.  
Similar task for purpose of interreligious and interethnic harmony Medvedev discussed with 
the representatives of civil society during the meeting of the Council for Civil Society 
Institutions and Human Rights held in the capital of Kabardino-Balkaria in 2011. Significance 
and improvement of education in history with respect to Russian multiethnic society and its 
role in Russian identity was also the topic of meeting on preparations for celebrating the 
1150th anniversary of Russia’s statehood where Medvedev stressed the necessity of 
maintaining “the so-called genetic memory of a nation and to develop the identity of our 
people.93” President has also mentioned that Russia’s historical advantage lays in 
multinational, powerful civilization with a unique cultural and ethnic potential that stimulates 
challenges that are needed to be overcome. Additionally, in 2012 Medvedev has signed 
executive order On Holding the Year of Russian History to promote the role of Russian 
history in global historical developments and to wake up interest among the citizens in history 
and Russia’s part in it. With such proceedings it is possible to assume that Medvedev’s 
identity construction was making reference to Slavophile’s ideas again, namely to their idea 
of special and historical role of Russia in the international processes which he used for 
making a progress in establishing harmony among the citizens with different ethnic 
background.  
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With respect to influential role of Orthodox Church inside the Russian society and as well as 
important denominator of Russian identity construction, Medvedev mentioned in his greetings 
to Patriarch Kirill and also stressed during the meeting with participants of the Bishops’ 
Council that interethnic clashes and the wave of extremism in country could be prevented by 
partnership between the Church and state authorities drawing the attention to “strengthen in 
society the fundamental values of Russia’s spiritual traditions as humanism, patriotism, 
tolerance towards other faiths, and good neighborliness.94” It is noteworthy to mention that 
interethnic and interfaith harmony in Medvedev’s addresses was present very often and since 
this period almost every address of Dmitry Medvedev towards Russia’s religious components 
did reference to emphasis on strengthening of such harmony among various ethnicities and 
denominations no matter if Islamic, Buddhist or Orthodox.  
According to policies aimed to stop any radical nationalism or extremism inside the country, 
Kremlin has performed several police activities, gestures and cancelations of various 
nationalistic movements, organizations as well criminal prosecution against extremist groups 
and their propaganda, and also adopted laws increasing efficacy of countering extremism, 
supported by establishing the Interdepartmental Commission on Countering Extremism. 
Nevertheless, government has also formulated the official position towards this issue in order 
to unite the citizens publicly.  
After bombing at Moscow Domodedovo airport in January 2011, Medvedev stated that 
besides the terrorism, the ethnic hatred, xenophobia, violence and propaganda is fundamental 
threat to existence of Russian Federation. Assuming the role of ethnicity and nationality with 
respect to identity and realizing the relevance of this issue in Russia’s social and political 
environment altogether with circumstances that were provoked with the wave of nationalism, 
the politics of identity and its construction during Medvedev’s presidential term has obtained 
another achievement to which was not paid enough attention previously in Post-Soviet Russia. 
Wave of nationalism stimulated by lack of attention towards ethnic policy in previous periods 
inside the Post-Soviet Russia initiated Russian government to solve this issue more seriously. 
In these regards Prime Minister Vladimir Putin mentioned the need to form “all-Russian 
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patriotism”, an analogue of Soviet patriotism95. Such idea can be traced or connected with 
previously mentioned role of the Great Patriotic War in formation of Russian identity, while 
the role of statues or monuments of Soviet soldiers and victory can play symbolic role that is 
common not only for ethnicities living in the Russia but as well in Post-Soviet countries and 
the assessment of interethnic and interfaith peace between ethnicities inside Russia by 
developing of all-Russian sense of nationality is having ideological, practical character. 
Realizing that fundamental effect of identity is merging of units on the basis of common 
elements or relation to particular object, ethnic consolidation on the basis of mutual all-
Russian sense of patriotism or nationality is having very important influence in context of 
construction of Russian identity. The process of such ignition with respect to the spread of 
nationalism that included only one ethnicity among the lot of others on the territory of Russia 
has proved that Russian identity was at that time in structural crisis what had an effect on 
tensions in domestic as well in foreign policy issues with regards of possible loss of influence 
of Russia in particular Post-Soviet countries, thus practical character of identity construction 
was necessary to achieve. 
As it was presented in previous chapter which was referred to historical analysis of Russian 
identity and its first crisis in 19 century, it was mentioned that Russian policy in that period 
was constructed mainly on pillars of Orthodoxy, autocracy and nationality. These pillars were 
identified by ruling elite as a “template” for implementation of policy; as well they were a 
background for motivation of Russia’s interests, concluding that those pillars were also kind 
of prescription for Russia’s identity construction. Those pillars were developing throughout 
the Russian history until the Soviet Union emergence. Formation of USSR has wiped out the 
pillars of nationality and religion in order to promote unity and integration among the citizens 
of Soviet republics while the later split of Soviet Union and the global pressure on Russia as a 
successor state of USSR in the meaning of destruction of communist ideology and adopting of 
Western, liberal one has brought chaos in Russian political orientation also due to its identity 
crisis. Such crisis was more or less present and not solved in Russia until particular decrees of 
Vladimir Putin as President in 2007 and his adoption of compatriots’ policy which was 
followed up and developed later by Dmitry Medvedev in office as presented. This chapter has 
illustrated that similar pillars of new Russian identity formation were present also during 
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Medvedev’s presidency, however, pillar of autocracy was not as much evident or presented as 
a one of the main pillars and it was subsided by more convenient term according to 
international environment by recognizing the Russian President as a “strong leader”. 
It is possible to observe that formation of Russian identity during Medvedev’s term was based 
on steps that were adopting the features of Russia’s historical formation of identity in the 18th 
and 19th century with regards to Orthodox Church and ideas of Slavophiles and their 
primordial vision of Russia as authentic and on its own way of development. These features 
were supplemented by ideological, utilitarian and unifying purpose of identity inherited from 
the Soviet times which can be perceived as an instrument for Eurasian character of Russian 
identity as well for Russia’s legitimization of policy in Eurasian region. Due to fact that this 
identity is kind different than the set of first features of identity is only confirming that 
constructivist’s opinion that identity is changing. This feature of Russian identity construction 
is referred mainly to the role of Great Patriotic War as well to policy of compatriots living 
abroad, nevertheless ethnic policy and anti-nationalist regulations are part of it as well.  
From the objective view of this paper and assuming the identity as an object of this study, this 
chapter has showed that both, constructivist’s and primordialist opinions on identity are right, 
i.e. identity can change or can be “rooted” respectively. From the subjective perspective of 
this work assuming the Russian identity construction, the chapter has analyzed on particular 
events how identity in Russia started its construction and that this process was intentional and 
was no coincidence, however, from philosophical point of view it is not possible to define the 
precise intentions inside the head of Dmitry Medvedev that led him to perform such steps, 
feasibly, it could be the identity. Next chapter will analyze further construction of Russian 
identity and implementation of it as well during presidential term of Vladimir Putin since 
2012.  
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Chapter 4: Russian Identity Construction during Presidential Term of Vladimir Putin 
2012-2016 
As Dmitry Medvedev refused to participate in 2012 Russian presidential elections, he 
nominated Vladimir Putin as only candidate of United Russia party. Putin has won in 
elections by overwhelming majority of support, preceded by his interesting speech during the 
Russia’s holiday named Defender of the Fatherland Day at Moscow’s Luzhniki stadium in 
front of some one hundred thousands of possible supporters. Vladimir Putin performed his 
speech with references to history, namely to 19th – Century Russian poet Mikhail Lermontov 
and his patriotic Borodino poem that commemorated battle against Napoleon in 1812, 
stressing that battle for Russia is going on and we (Russia) will win because Russia is a 
victory nation. Among the others, Putin has also mentioned the diversity of Russian 
ethnicities that they are altogether forming strong nation and Russia is not pushing away 
anyone, on the contrary Russia is inviting everyone who perceives Russia as its own 
motherland and who is ready to protect, cherish and believe in Russia to unite around. 
Another point of his speech was that nobody will be dictating or trying to apply its will to 
Russia as far country has its own will and its sense for determination. 
From this speech it is possible to identify Putin’s main aims and values which were his 
ground in order to obtain success in elections and maintain presidential office. It is evident 
that the role of patriotism and unification based on nationality and ethnicity connected with 
history are the main elements proposed by Putin to citizens with aim to be elected, and 
whether these features were evident also during his presidential term will be analyzed in this 
chapter. Taking into account previous chapters of this paper, it is worth saying that those 
elements in Putin’s speech are apparently linked with the identity construction in terms like 
unity, ethnicity, nationality, history and in issues of domestic and foreign policy as well. 
However, previous chapter has analyzed construction of Russian identity in politics at first 
stage mainly in its formation process; this part will analyze and show Russian identity 
creation and its reinforcement more in practical terms. 
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4.1 Strengthening of National Consciousness 
President Putin started to perform those ideas proposed in his “Borodino speech” literally 
since his inauguration on the 7th of May 2012. On that same day, Putin has signed various 
executive orders that were concerning state’s social, demographic or education policy. For 
instance, executive order on measures to implement state social policy was aimed on 
preserving and developing of Russian culture by several instructions that included 
development of cultural centers, internet information network and free access to it for public, 
support for talented children, creating virtual museums and galleries and last but not least 
grants and scholarships for cultural and arts figures.96 Executive order on demographic policy 
was aimed among steps on fertility rising also on measures improving migration policy in 
terms of education and implementation of programs of integration and social adaptation of 
migrants. Assuming the role of culture and education in national consciousness altogether 
with provision of education for migrants is making sense in adaptation and purpose of such 
policies in order to strengthen the consciousness among citizens and unify them in perception 
of the reality as well identify them on international scale with Russia’s interests, needs or 
purposes. Such “social” policy is possibly supplementing the role of ideology, which has 
Putin refused before becoming the President of Russian Federation in 1999 stating that 
“Russia should not have a state ideology,”97 nevertheless it is definitely strengthening 
Russia‘s national consciousness and constructing identity at the same time. 
4.1.1 Patriotism and Identity 
Besides annual celebrations of Victory Day on 9th of May which was during Medvedev’s term 
yearly accompanied by presidential address, typical military parade, lying of the wreaths or 
uncovering of new monuments, in 2012 president Putin added congratulations to the leaders 
of CIS countries, Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia on the 67th anniversary of victory in 
the Great Patriotic War. Putin congratulated by letters to presidents of particular countries 
except Georgia where the consignee were the people of Georgia instead of president. In his 
messages, Putin was mentioning mainly the necessity of “brotherhood”, “selfless patriotism” 
or “glorious historic traditions” in defeating of Nazism and that these and other values serves 
                                                          
96 Executive Order on measures to implement state social policy. // Official Internet Resources of the President 
of Russia. URL: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/page/301 (04.29.2017) 
97 Sakwa R. Power and Policy in Putin’s Russia. New York: Routledge, 1999. P. 22   
 61 
 
as a basis and are important for strategic partnership and relations between mentioned 
countries. This act can be perceived to some extent as strengthening of the role of Great 
Patriotic War in Russian identity context to another stage with keeping in mind previous 
Putin’s address to Post-Soviet space during revealing of monument as a Prime Minister. By 
this act Putin only confirmed that WWII events are part of re-established Russian identity and 
that Eurasian element of identity is renewed factor for influence in Post-Soviet space and for 
legitimization of policies in this region. Additionally, as any other acts related to Great 
Patriotic War and their patriotic feature, it is also strengthening national consciousness not 
only among the citizens of Russian Federation but also of citizens living in former USSR 
countries that are perceiving Russia as their homeland and influencing the process of 
unification between different ethnics for the purpose of maintaining common sense and 
acceptation of the Russian nationality.  
Nevertheless, among the role of patriotism and strengthening of national consciousness one 
cannot forget to mention Patriotic War of 1812 (French invasion of Russia) and its connection 
to Putin’s construction of identity with regards to his pre-election “Borodino speech” and the 
“real Borodino speech” during the celebrations marking the 200th anniversary of the battle of 
Borodino already during his third presidential term on September 2nd of 2012. During his 
speech, Putin mentioned relation between the battles of 1812 and 1941 in this region and 
underlined that two patriotic wars will remain forever in history showing the exceptional 
patriotism of Russian people and at the same time two significant cities in regards of patriotic 
wars were ordered by the title of City of Military Glory.98 
Another important element in strengthening of patriotic feelings among the Russian citizens 
and mainly among Russian youth were the measures proposed by Vladimir Putin during the 
meeting with public representatives on patriotic education for young people. Putin insisted 
that the system of Russia’s education is determinant of country’s future development and also 
significant for prevention of losing identity in a very comprehensive modern setting and 
continued that Russia’s future must be build on strong foundation that is patriotism.99 To be 
more specific, Putin meant mainly respect for Russia’s traditions, history, long period of 
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culture and remarkable experience of coexistence of numerous languages and ethnic groups 
on the territory of Russia. For the purpose of achieving of such goal Russian President 
suggested that any public content as medias, advertising, internet, audio or video networks 
must be “to serious, heightened attention from lawmakers and the public”. As a message of 
this meeting, Putin concluded that Russia stopped to pay attention towards education of 
patriotism what was during the Russian Empire times developed by the Church, while 
suggesting that such patriotic education should be done skillfully, uniting people of different 
nationalities and religions and at the same time he repeated that it should not be ideology-
driven. At this point the component of patriotism building during Putin’s administration is 
having further implications towards national consciousness, nationalism and further on 
Russia’s identity construction as well. However, it is difficult to say whether national 
consciousness is subordinated to patriotism, or if nationalism is subordinated to national 
consciousness or any other scheme of subordination of these three terms and its further 
relation towards identity, this is not the objective of this thesis. Objective is to prove that 
systemic development of mentioned terms are having effect on the construction of Russian 
identity under the administration of Vladimir Putin.  
Additionally, any activity towards facts that are recognized by the international military 
tribunal, as spreading of false information about Soviet activities during WWII, approving the 
crimes that this tribunal judged or spread of disrespectful information related to Russia’s 
military glory or symbols will be punished by the Federal Law that counters attempts to 
infringe on historical memory in relation to events of WWII.100 
4.1.2 Nationalism 
          In order to improve exact policies, goals and targets in the sphere of interethnic relations and 
for preparing of drafts for the state priorities in this sector, as well to ensure the cooperation 
between the federal state power bodies and constituent entities, local authorities, academicians 
and public associations, President Putin has signed executive order on the Council for 
Interethnic Relations under the President of Russian Federation.101 During first meeting of this 
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council Putin has lined essentials for the National Strategy that should be followed and 
finalized until the end of 2012. According to President, essentials of strategy should include 
the issues of education, information with respect to cultural and historical events and 
promotion of Russian and other languages in Russia. Putin concluded that national accord, 
strong interethnic ties, peace and harmony are essential for integrity and sovereignty of Russia 
and are necessary for facing of issues in economic and social sphere as well are crucial for 
foreign policy and nation-building.102 From the proposed strategy and with regards to national 
consciousness and identity, especially the phrase of nation-building is very interesting. 
According to Panov (2010) nation-building can be defined as the action of reproducing or 
constructing of national identity and is predominantly discursive process that aspires to justify 
and define why the population of the state is a whole entity, meaning that officials have to 
provide the citizens with “appropriate notions, reasonable categorizations, cognitive schemes, 
narratives, myths and so forth.”103 Significance of nation-building further lies in assumption 
that any activity that is concerning national notions is having effect on the nationalism, and 
the nature of those notions chosen by the administration are influential on that which type of 
nationalism will emerge.104 Simply, nation-building is influential for emergence of 
nationalism and identity construction. 
Following the next meeting of the Council for Interethnic Relations chaired by Vladimir Putin 
on February 2013, participants were debating about the implementation of the National Ethnic 
Policy Strategy through to 2025. Again, core objective discussed and proposed by Putin was 
to achieve harmony and peace among multiethnic and multi-religious composition of Russian 
people for the purpose of unity and feeling that they are citizens of a one country.105 This 
objective was formulated in strategy that was achieved in December 2012 and called the new 
National Ethnic Policy Strategy through to 2025 that has changed previous policy in these 
issues adopted in 1996 and known as the Outline of Russian State Policy on Nationalities. The 
essential difference between these strategies lies in the role of different ethnics in forming of 
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Russian nation. While the 1996 strategy indicates main, “state-forming role” to the Russian 
(Russkii) people, the new 2012 strategy insists on “unifying role occupied by the ethnic 
Russians in generating a unique socio-cultural civilizational community, the multi-people 
Russian (Rossiiskiy) nation.”106 In order to deepen or specify this strategy more, Putin has 
also proposed several points how to achieve it and make this plan successful also supported 
with the Russia’s National Policy Strategy through to 2025.107 According to Putin, the 
fundamental point for achieving national unity and for the interethnic communication in the 
country is promotion and creation of favorable conditions for study of Russian language, what 
is further essential and influential for other points of this national policy like education, civic 
and cultural environment. Other points were aimed basically again on points introduced by 
Dmitry Medvedev during his administration and mentioned in previous chapter that is - 
education and the role of schools in shaping of interethnic relations, the forms of textbooks, 
state projects referred to national history and other cultural projects that will “strengthen the 
unity of the peoples of Russia and our (Russia’s) historical and cultural unity.”108 In these 
regards, Putin has introduced several various projects launched by National State Television, 
Radio Company, Russian Geographical Society, or governmental packages for strengthening 
interethnic relations via internet and media, federal program for support of public initiatives 
called Strengthening the Unity of Russian Nation and the Ethnic and Cultural Development of 
the Peoples of Russia or proposed various major sporting and political events like Olympic 
Games, Universiade and so on.   
Paradoxically, as it was mentioned in previous chapter, Medvedev’s anti-nationalism 
measures referred to ethnicity had after all to some extent effect on rise of nationalism during 
Putin’s third presidential term. This effect lied in building of new all-Russian nationality 
without differences on ethnicity and strengthening of “togetherness” and national 
consciousness by various presidential instructions towards Council for Interethnic Relations 
in meaning of television programs regarded to education, history, traditions and culture of 
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various peoples in Russia or holding a yearly national folk festival Together we are Russia.109 
Such attempts for organization of ethnic harmony and indifferences among citizens in Russia 
also for the purpose of re-establishing of Russian identity have brought specific kind of 
nationalism, which some observers likens it to so called “ethnonationalism.”110 However, by 
assuming previous analysis that Putin is trying to unite all ethnics in Russia under the one all-
Russian idea, opinion of “ethnonationalism” which prefers self-determination and direction of 
one ethnic111 in multiethnic environment is at this stage somehow irrelevant. 
On the first sight it is possible to observe that Putin has continued in the construction of 
Russian identity in the Medvedev’s “steps” and his ideas, but what is more important, Putin 
switched from the “talks” or better say from the theory of identity formation to the real action 
of identity construction in practice domestically and what will be analyzed further to the 
“real” identity politics with the impact on foreign policy. The fact of linking of Russia’s 
identity to international affairs or “events that are taking place in the world” Putin confirmed 
during his speech at the meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club112 on September 
2013. At this meeting Russian President also declared that “finding and strengthening of 
national identity is fundamental for Russia”, and as well that “debates about identity and 
about our (Russia’s) future are impossible unless their participants are patriotic”. This 
confirms that analysis provided above with regards to relation of Putin’s patriotism and 
discourse over Russian nationality is having planed and conscious impact on Russian identity 
construction.  
4.2 The Ukraine Crisis and Russian Identity Interaction 
The mass protests on November of 2013 which resulted from refusal of Ukrainian President 
Viktor Yanukovych to sign an association agreement with the European Union led into 
formation of political opposition known as “Euromaidan” that insisted on collaboration with 
the EU and overthrow of Yanukovych. Taking into consideration Kremlin’s worries about the 
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NATO’s enlargement after the fall of USSR closer to Russia’s borders and a role of 
“Atlanticism” in the relationship between the EU and NATO, it is evident that Russia was 
worried about the destiny of Ukraine. After the first weeks of “Maidan” protests in Ukraine, 
Russian president thought that such crisis in Ukraine can be extinguished by raise of common 
trade between the countries with very favorable conditions for Ukraine. During the press 
statement following a meeting of Russian-Ukrainian Interstate Commission on 17th of 
December 2013, Putin stressed that the “countries are strategic partners and Russia is 
Ukraine’s biggest trade partner by far.”113 Russian President later continued with other 
numbers related to economic sector between the countries as well with the special gas prices 
for Ukraine. But what is more important for the purpose of this research is that Putin tried to 
head off the crisis in Ukraine and its possible accession to the EU with the words of common 
historical events between the countries like upcoming anniversaries with regards to culture-
200th anniversary of Taras Shevchenko birth, WWII victory-70th anniversary of Sevastopol 
liberation altogether with upcoming 70th anniversary of victory in Great Patriotic War or with 
respect to common history-1000th anniversary of the death of Grand Prince Vladimir. 
Realizing these points with regards to analysis on previous pages of this research it is evident 
to assume that Putin was trying to settle the disputes in Ukraine also with politics related to 
Russian identity that Russian administration started to construct since 2010 and thus newly 
reshaped Russian identity started to play its role also in foreign policy. 
4.2.1 Crimean Crisis 
However, these identity statements were still only words, nevertheless with planned program 
for the future in the more or less symbolic effect, they were altogether with trade 
developments among the countries not efficient to calm down the discontented Ukrainian 
citizens and “Euromaidan” governmental opposition what has resulted into violent revolution 
with success of “Euromaidan” movement and president Yanukovych was forced to leave his 
office in the February 2014. In such conditions, new interim government was formed in 
Ukraine which was more inclining in favor of European and US direction, rather than the 
Russian one. These circumstances led to a political schism with regards to orientation and the 
future of Ukraine between the Russian speaking citizens on the Eastern and Southern parts as 
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well Crimea and the rest of the country. People in the concerned parts of Ukraine were not in 
favor of revolution while they were demanding autonomy and closer relations with Russia 
what has later erupted into different demonstrations in the East of Ukraine. Bearing in mind 
Kremlin’s assumptions towards Rossiiskii people and its relation towards Russia’s identity 
construction, it is presumable on which side in its foreign policy would Russia in this conflict 
stand and who will be supported by the Kremlin. However, at that time of this crisis it was not 
probably as evident by third parties as today that Russian foreign policy will behave in such 
manner also due to lack of interest or information that Russian identity is under construction 
with specific features which are shaping and influencing further action of Russian 
administration. Nevertheless, the new interim government which occurred in Ukraine after the 
revolution was not recognized by Moscow and in following days Putin has submitted appeal 
to the Federation Council on March 1st 2014 which approved deployment of the military 
contingent of the Russian Federation Armed Forces on the territory of Ukrainian Crimea. The 
document stated that such solution is necessary due to: “…extraordinary situation that has 
developed in Ukraine and the threat to citizens of the Russian Federation, our 
compatriots…114” Notwithstanding the fact that apparent Russian soldiers without insignias 
has occurred on the territory of Crimea at the end of February115, that is even before Putin’s 
appeal.  
Following Kremlin’s permission to allocate Russian soldiers in Crimea officially, Vladimir 
Putin did not miss the calls from representatives of the EU, UN or USA with respect to 
situation in Crimea, stating almost the same answer to each deputy that such decision was 
necessary in order to defend Russia’s interests, citizens and compatriots from criminal actions 
of ultranationalists supported by the Kiev.116  
Reaction of the Supreme Council of Crimea towards revolution in Kiev and its opinion that 
illegitimate government has been formed resulted into referendum about Crimea’s 
reunification with Russian Federation which was preceded by declaration of Crimea’s 
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independence as a necessary condition for further referendum.117 The results of referendum 
where almost 96% of ballots were for joining of Russia were disapproved by the majority of 
the countries stating that the referendum is illegal, while Putin during his telephone 
conversation with German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that “the Crimean people express 
their will in full accordance with international law, in particular, article 1 of the UN Charter 
that sets forth the principle of equal rights and self-determination of the people.”118Interesting 
point has Putin added during his telephone call with the US President Barack Obama on the 
same issue where Russian leader stated that referendum was also in line with Kosovo 
precedent.119 
4.2.2 Crimea as a Part of Russian Identity 
Following the results of referendum and admission of the Republic of Crimea into the Russian 
Federation, Putin made his address to the Russian deputies and representatives in the Kremlin 
on 18th of March 2014. In his speech it is possible to recognize that the “moral” justification 
of Crimean “return” to Russia is legalized on the basis of Russian identity, which is further 
overlapping with the “technical” justification that is supported by Kosovo precedent as well 
by UN Charter’s right of nations to self-determination. As for the examples of Russian 
identity construction context and its relation to history and other elements analyzed 
previously, Putin mentioned that “everything in Crimea speaks of our (Russia’s) shared 
history and pride…this is the location of ancient Khersones, where Prince Vladimir was 
baptized…his spiritual feat of adopting Orthodoxy predetermined the overall basis of the 
culture, civilization and human values that unite the people of Russia, Ukraine and 
Belarus.”120President continued with “…the graves of Russian soldiers whose bravery 
brought Crimea into the Russian Empire are also in Crimea…this is also Sevastopol-
legendary city with an outstanding history, a fortress that serves as the birthplace of Russia’s 
Black Sea Fleet…Crimea is Balaklava and Kerch, Malakhov Kurgan and Sapun Ridge…each 
one of these places is dear to our hearts, symbolizing Russian military glory and outstanding 
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valour.” Nevertheless, Vladimir Putin mentioned also ethnic elements of Russian identity 
with regards to Crimea as “…Crimea is a unique blend of different peoples’ cultures and 
traditions…this makes it similar to Russia as a whole, where not a single ethnic group has 
been lost over the centuries…Russians and Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars and people of other 
ethnic groups have lived side by side in Crimea, retaining their own identity, traditions, 
languages and faith.” To sum up, all components like patriotism, history, culture, ethnicity or 
Orthodoxy existent in Russian identity and its construction since 2010 were present also in 
Putin’s address towards the accession of Crimea to Russian Federation. 
In order for “technical” legitimization or recognition of such action by international 
environment, Putin has made parallel of the right of nations for self-determination declared by 
UN Charter in Crimean case compared to case “…when Ukraine seceded from the USSR it 
did exactly the same thing, almost word for word.” Moreover, Russian President mentioned 
that the Supreme Council of Crimea referred also “…to well-known Kosovo precedent – a 
precedent our western colleagues created with their own hands in a very similar situation, 
when they agreed that the unilateral separation of Kosovo from Serbia, exactly what Crimea 
is doing now, was legitimate and did not require any permission from the country’s central 
authorities.” Putin further continued with analogues of double standards of the West in the 
cases of Yugoslavia, Libya or Iraq with the reference to the invasions and bombings without 
UN mandates and West’s “hypocrisy” and that the “…infamous policy of containment, led in 
the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries, continues today.” 
Just for illustration, according to polls conducted by Pew Research Center, huge majority of 
Russians (84%) believed that referendum in Crimea was free and fair as well 89% of Russians 
think that the Ukrainian government should recognize the results of Crimean referendum.121 
With respect to polls performed by Levada-Center in the period of 21-24 March 2014, 57% of 
Russians supported Crimea’s unification with Russia definitely, 31% mostly, while only 6% 
were mostly against, 1% definitely against and 4% were not sure.122 On further question “why 
do you support Crimea’s unification with Russia?” for those who answered positively for 
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unification with Russia, 74% answered that “because Crimea is a Russian land”, 36% 
responded “because otherwise Crimean people could have been subjected to violence by 
Ukrainian right-wing radicals” and 16% replied “because otherwise Crimea would have been 
forcibly ukrainianized.”123 From this research, it can be measured various outcomes about the 
social standings of Russian citizens. One can be that the majority of Russian’s are supporting 
country’s foreign policy, another can be that people are supporting Putin, nevertheless, 
outcome that Russian citizens are identified with components of Russian identity that were 
used as a “motive” for particular political action is also valid, thus Kremlin’s identity 
construction is interactive with country’s citizens. However, we cannot forget about the 
influential role of media’s coverage, which was during the Ukrainian crisis and particularly 
during Crimea annexation decisive. For majority of Russian citizens, state-controlled 
television was during these events certainly the most important and credible source of 
information, as well significant basis for regime’s political mobilization, while President Putin 
played a role of leading newsmaker and essential expert of political message that was further 
spread and clarified by the official media.124 At the same time, it is not purpose of this paper 
to find out what is the source of inspiration of citizen’s opinion, maybe to some extent it is 
important the final opinion of majority with regards to identity and whether it collides with 
official identity construction, this can be used just for illustrational purposes and again, it is 
also not purpose of thesis. 
As it was analyzed, all of those components of Russian identity and its construction since 
2010 that were mentioned in previous paragraphs were also used for justification of foreign 
policy of Russian Federation with respect to Crimea in the eyes of domestic, public context. 
Components of patriotism, Orthodoxy, history, culture or ethnicity mentioned in Putin’s 
speech were influential and played important role in fulfilling particular action towards 
Crimea. Additionally, for the purpose of justification this political action not only at home but 
also world-widely, Putin has also referred firstly to moral values as the part of Russian 
identity stating that “…those who opposed the coup (Maidan) were immediately threatened 
with repression…naturally, the first in line here was Crimea, the Russian-speaking 
Crimea…in view of this, the residents of Crimea and Sevastopol turned to Russia for help in 
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defending their rights and lives, in preventing the events that were unfolding and are still 
underway in Kiev, Donetsk, Kharkov and other Ukrainian cities..naturally we could not leave 
this plea unheeded; we could not abandon Crimea and its residents in distress…this would 
have been betrayal on our part.” Secondly, international context was further strengthened by 
Putin’s turn to components of Western identity and its values that are referred to justice or 
democracy and recognized by international environment.  
Just for illustration, according to polls conducted by Pew Research Center, huge majority of 
Russians (84%) believed that referendum in Crimea was free and fair as well 89% of Russians 
think that the Ukrainian government should recognize the results of Crimean referendum.125 
With respect to polls performed by Levada-Center in the period of 21-24 March 2014, 57% of 
Russians supported Crimea’s unification with Russia definitely, 31% mostly, while only 6% 
were mostly against, 1% definitely against and 4% were not sure.126 On further question “why 
do you support Crimea’s unification with Russia?” for those who answered positively for 
unification with Russia, 74% answered that “because Crimea is a Russian land”, 36% 
responded “because otherwise Crimean people could have been subjected to violence by 
Ukrainian right-wing radicals” and 16% replied “because otherwise Crimea would have been 
forcibly ukrainianized”127. From this research, it can be measured various outcomes about the 
social standings of Russian citizens. One can be that the majority of Russian’s are supporting 
country’s foreign policy, another can be that people are supporting Putin, nevertheless, 
outcome that Russian citizens are identified with components of Russian identity that were 
used as a “motive” for particular political action is also valid, thus Kremlin’s identity 
construction is interactive with country’s citizens. However, we cannot forget about the 
influential role of media’s coverage, which was during the Ukrainian crisis and particularly 
during Crimea annexation decisive. For majority of Russian citizens, state-controlled 
television was during these events certainly the most important and credible source of 
information, as well significant basis for regime’s political mobilization, while President Putin 
played a role of leading newsmaker and essential expert of political message that was further 
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spread and clarified by the official media.128 At the same time, it is not the purpose of this 
paper to find out what is the source of inspiration of citizen’s opinion, certainly to some extent 
it is important whether the final opinion of majority with regards to identity collides with 
official Russian identity construction, this can be used just for illustrational purposes and 
again, also it is not the aim of this thesis. Aim of this paragraph is to prove that the Kremlin’s 
action towards Crimea as well address of President Putin proved that previously considered 
components of Russian identity, constructed since 2010 started to be influential in foreign 
policy of Russian Federation and that since the third presidential term of Vladimir Putin any 
“injustice” or global action towards Russian people or any of components of Russian identity 
mainly on historical territory of Russia can await adequate response from Russian 
government. 
4.2.3 Unrest in South-Eastern Ukraine in Russian Identity Discourse 
As it was delineated previously, the results of revolution in Kiev in February 2014 were 
unacceptable for majority of citizens similarly as in Crimea also in the South-Eastern parts of 
Ukraine. These are the parts of Ukraine where majority of around 17% from total country’s 
population are presented by ethnic Russians.129 Citizens living on this territory of Ukraine 
were not satisfied with the new country’s administration what they reflected in the mass anti-
Maidan protests since March 2014 in the regions of Donetsk, Kharkov, Luhansk and others. 
Dissatisfied citizens were demanding adaptation of Ukrainian constitutions with the reference 
to decentralization of power to regions as well the status of Russian language. At the 
beginning of April, situation has further continued into seizing of several administrative 
buildings by pro-Russian protesters in this region with the demand of similar referendum as in 
Crimea.130 However, after first seizing of administrative buildings by pro-Russian activists 
and declaring the People’s Republic of Donetsk on April 6th, interim president of Ukraine 
Oleksandr Turchynov asked Ukrainian troops to take “anti-terrorist” action what has resulted 
into gunfights between the Ukrainian army and pro-Russian militants. Despite the evident 
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insurgency in the region of South-Eastern Ukraine, Vladimir Putin has expressed his greetings 
to Odessa residents on the 70th anniversary of liberation from Nazi occupation131. The text of 
his greetings stated among the heroism of various ethnic groups which fought together for 
liberation of Odessa and Ukraine, also his opinion that “centuries-old traditions of good 
neighborliness and mutual support will continue to unite Russians and Ukrainians.” Putin also 
stressed that common duty of Russians and Ukrainians it to “cherish the memory of the past 
war, to thwart any attempt to rewrite history and to bring up the younger generation 
on the high ideals of patriotism and pride for our Great Victory.” From his message is 
possible to assume that Russian President tried on the one hand to calm down the situation in 
the Ukraine with identity discourse regarded to ethnic unity and history with respect to 
common memory between the Ukrainians and Russians. But on the other hand he underlined 
the discourse of patriotism and Great Victory against that Nazism, which has according to him 
supported by the part of new Ukrainian administration after the Maidan revolution, and so he 
delineated justification for his support of those who fight against it meaning also against new 
Ukrainian establishment. In short, Putin presented his standpoint towards emerging conflict in 
the identity context. Sadly, one month afterwards, Putin was obliged to send condolences to 
the same city due to “punitive operations of Kiev authorities”132 resulted in dozens of people 
burned alive in the administrative building blockaded by pro-governmental protesters.133 
 After few days of escalation of the conflict in southeast of Ukraine, Russian President during 
TV program called Direct Line with Vladimir Putin has reopened and strengthened the 
discourse of history component of Russian identity with relation to Ukraine by reminding that 
the concerned parts of Ukraine inhabited by ethnic Russians and Russian speakers are the part 
of historical region of Russia also known as Novorossiya in the tsarist days that were given to 
Ukraine by the Soviet government in the 1920s by unknown reason.134 
Gradual seizing of administrative buildings by pro-Russian militants in different cities of 
southeastern Ukraine led into proclaiming of sovereignty of Luhansk and Donetsk People’s 
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Republics on May 12th, while on 14th of May prime ministers of both self-proclaimed 
republics submitted an agreement of unity of regions into Union of People’s Republics-
Novorossiya.135 This led into increased Ukrainian military presence, mainly after the 
presidential elections in Ukraine on 25th May 2014, thus to more clashes between pro-Russian 
militants and Kiev forces and at the same time situation in this region started to have features 
of civil war. In these regards, Vladimir Putin has exchanged many telephone calls and 
meetings with the representatives of EU, USA condemning the “punitive operation conducted 
by army and requisite to establish ceasefire and peaceful dialogue between Kiev and 
representatives from southeastern Ukraine.”136 
Promising opportunity for creation of dialogue between the two sides of Ukrainian conflict 
was after declaration on a ceasefire of newly elected Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko on 
June 20th 2014. Putin’s reaction on this was performed in June 22nd on the day when Great 
Patriotic war began to which he made parallel again, stating that “so many years after the start 
of Great Patriotic War, blood is being split on the former Soviet Union’s soil and this is 
terrible thing.”137 Russian President stressed that detailed dialogue is required for the purpose 
of renewing of Ukrainian integrity, and few days after in order to help of de-escalation of 
conflict, Putin requested to repeal Federation Council Resolution On the Use of Armed Forces 
of Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine.138 However, this ceasefire was many times 
interrupted and in addition it was hit hard by downing of passenger plane of Malaysian 
airlines on the territory of southeastern Ukraine, while neither of participants in the conflict 
has not confessed to this act. Afterwards, massive fights were taken in various cities of the 
concerned region139. With respect to this Putin addressed message to Novorossiya soldiers 
that confirmed Moscow’s stance to the conflict stating that “It is clear that militia has 
achieved a major success in intercepting Kiev’s military operation, which represents a grave 
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danger to the population of Donbass and which has already led to the loss of many lives 
among peaceful residents.” 140  
The first agreement on stopping of conflict in Ukraine was signed on September 5th 2014 
known as Minsk Agreement in which were present parties of OSCE, Ukraine, Russia and 
leaders of Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics. This agreement included except the 
details of ceasefire also the requirements of separatists as “special status” of People’s 
Republics as well free use of Russian language. Ukrainian authorities also guaranteed no 
prosecution or punishment of participants in the conflict and provision of elections for local 
leaders.141 Despite the fact that majority of the agreements has been fulfilled, the ceasefire 
was violated several times what was one of the reason why any tremendous peace-talks were 
not taken. 
With the connection of the Ukraine crisis and Russian identity with regards to compatriots as 
a one of its components, it is important to mention domestic measures related to Ukrainian 
refugees. Russian administration performed several amendments since June 2013 to law on 
Russian citizenship for simplifying the procedure of its obtaining by foreign nationals, 
stateless persons and recognized native speakers of the Russian language.142 Additionally, 
during meeting of government members on July, Director of the Federal Migration Service 
Konstantin Romodanovsky introduced Vladimir Putin with the draft of Presidential Executive 
Order which states principles on relocation of compatriots as the part of national program 
what helps also people that were forced to leave Ukraine.143 This is also stating the criterions 
that compatriot needs to meet in order to receive citizenship within one year instead of eight. 
These were the residence of compatriots or their direct ascendants on the territory of Russian 
Empire or Soviet Union, moving to Russia and achieving permanent residence, renunciation 
of previous citizenship and status of Russian language speaker.   
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To conclude the interaction of Russia’s identity with the conflict in southeastern Ukraine, it is 
important to assume the Kremlin’s reference to history and ethnicity as components of 
Russian identity. In this case, Moscow has referred several times to “Russian historical lands” 
and Russian speakers which are oppressed by governmental unwillingness to apply citizen’s 
requirements in exchange of accepting Kiev’s authority. However, these were still only verbal 
statements that proved the role of Russian identity as motives and sympathies of Kremlin 
towards the particular side of the conflict in southeastern Ukraine, it has not presented any 
particular tactile or evident action of Kremlin towards the Ukraine also due to fact that 
opinions and convincing proofs on Russian presence in Ukraine are to huge extent 
contradictory. And if are those proofs or evidences due to whatever reason convincing for 
somebody, Russian representatives are refusing to admit them144, thus they have no value to 
analyze them in the Russian identity discourse as they are appearing as to be non-existent for 
the Russia as object of this research. Nevertheless, the next paragraph will prove that these 
verbal statements or verbal action at least by taking Russian official position was enough to 
perceive Russian identity as a source of conflict between the Russia and West with regards to 
southeastern Ukraine, while the case of Crimea was bit different with respect of Russia’s 
involvement. 
4.3. Sanctions-Russian Identity as a Source of Conflict with the West 
Since the beginning of the crisis in Ukraine, various representatives of West were suspecting 
Kremlin for inciting the crisis by its support of secessionist ambitions of particular actors in 
Crimea and southeastern parts of Ukraine. However, Russian representatives has never 
admitted that its government played role in the escalation of conflict to that extent which was 
presented by the West145 what has reflected into huge debate about the involvement of third 
parties represented by Russia and West into the Ukrainian crisis.  
The fundamental difference in positions towards situation in Ukraine between Russia and 
West (plus Ukraine as well) is in the framing of the groundbreaking events which happened in 
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this country since autumn 2013 until spring 2014. Spring 2014 was not the conclusion of the 
whole “situation” in the country, but it definitely was a pretext for what has happened 
afterwards. West with Ukraine as well has framed that “power transition” in the country as a 
revolution or in many cases as a “Revolution of dignity.”146 In western sources it was outlined 
as three months long period of civic protests against corrupted regime of Ukrainian president 
Yanukovych that resulted into violent but successful uprising.147 On the contrary, Russian 
framing of the situation in Ukraine was held in context of the “coup d’état”, later also 
confirmed by the Moscow court.148 Russian administration was stating that this coup was 
supported and organized by USA and was blaming Washington for its “crude interference in 
the former Soviet republic.”149  
After the “power transition” in Ukraine on February 2014 and disagreement of the citizens in 
the southeast of Ukraine but mainly in Crimea with this transition, western Medias started to 
publish the articles about Russian invasion with regards to “little green men.”150 In 
accordance to that there was pressure from the West on president Putin to explain this 
situation of Russian soldiers influencing the situation in Crimea; he explained it as these are 
the “self-defense units.”151 However, during Putin’s interview with French medias in June 
2014, Russian President made bit different statement on same dispute of annexation of 
Crimea by Russian troops. Putin admitted that Russian troops helped Crimean people hold a 
referendum on their independence and desire to join the Russian Federation and he continued 
that because …”Europe and US was supporting anti-constitutional coup in Ukraine…we 
could not allow a historical part of the Russian territory with predominantly ethnic Russian 
population to be incorporated into an international military alliance, especially because 
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Crimeans wanted to be part of Russia.”152 The role of Russian identity in the case of Crimea is 
undeniable and can be concluded by Putin’s address to government members after the 
Crimean accession where president stated if there was no choice as the Crimean people made, 
it would meant that “NATO’s navy would be right in this city of Russia’s military glory what 
would make a real threat to whole southern Russia…we are against of having military 
alliance in our historic territory…I cannot imagine that we would travel to Sevastopol to visit 
NATO sailors.”153 With the development of the situation in Crimea, USA and EU imposed 
several sanctions on the Russia and vice-versa with the effect of mutual damage. 
In the case of southeastern Ukraine the dispute was little bit different. Since the beginning of 
unrest in this region, as it was mentioned previously, Putin declared this territory also known 
as Novorossiya as the part of “historic land” of Russia, populated by Russian speakers and 
given to Ukraine by unknown reason. This identification is constructing prediction that Russia 
would have in this region interests to defend its people but with the logic of imposed 
sanctions from the West, Russia is being denied to defend its interests. Realizing the 
accession or annexation of Crimea as a decisive point for imposing the sanctions on Russia 
and further as some kind of Russia’s action against values of the West. It is not possible to 
observe similar action of Kremlin towards southeastern Ukraine, at least not any that was 
confirmed by Moscow officially or the one which is empirically possible to justify by the 
actors of international environment that Russia is actively involved in the conflict, except the 
humanitarian aid by sending of convoys. However, sanctions on Russia were extended also 
after further escalation of this conflict, while interruptions of ceasefire convened by latest 
Minsk agreements from February 2015 still continues and conflict in Ukraine is “frozen”. 
Realizing the components of Russian identity in Putin’s addresses, statements or amendments, 
one cannot deny that Russian identity is influential in certain political action of Russian 
Federation towards Crimea. The motives of Russian foreign policy in the case of Crimea 
influenced by Russian identity led into impending of various economic and political sanctions 
on Russia from the EU and USA. The analysis in this paragraph has proved that Russian 
identity is in some aspects responsible for the conflict between the Russia and the West and 
                                                          
152 Vladimir Putin’s interview with Radio Europe 1 and TF1 TV channel. // Official Internet Resources of the 
President of Russia. URL: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/page/177 
153 Address by Russian President of the Russian Federation. // Official Internet Resources of the President of 
Russia. URL: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603 (05.11.2017) 
 79 
 
also has showed that how can be this conflict perceived through the Russian identity 
construction. It is showing conflict between identity of West that is regarded to values as anti-
corruption fight or democracy for example in framing of Ukrainian “Revolution of Dignity” 
against and the values of Russian identity with respect to its values intertwined with history, 
patriotism or ethnicity, what can lead to assumption that one of the element(s) responsible for 
the crisis in Ukraine is represented by identity. To what extent is identity influential in this 
example depends on perception of particular actor pays attention to its identity, nevertheless, 
this research has showed so far that Russian administration is constructing Russian identity 
intensively what has revealed also in its foreign policy towards Ukraine. However, another 
point of identity role in Ukraine crisis can be outlined by assuming of identity crisis of 
particular actor in this case probably/most definitely of Ukraine (thesis that national/ethnic 
identity crisis in Ukraine with regards to dissatisfaction and split among citizens towards 
governmental action, both during Poroshenko and Yanukovych and further as a reason of 
whole Ukraine crisis-identity crisis) and further through the perception of the clash between 
the identities of Russia, West and Ukraine.  
4.4 Recent Developments in Russian Identity  
As it was analyzed in previous paragraphs towards Ukraine crisis, Russian identity played  
important role in foreign policy of Russian Federation. With this in mind, it is possible to 
assume that Russian identity in this period have turned from the process of construction 
already to process of implementation of its specific features in the policy of Kremlin. 
However, as Putin mentioned during the Valdai International Discussion Club, identity is 
“rather living form than thing that last forever”154 and its process of construction and 
strengthening is connected to the important worldwide events and process of globalization. 
This paragraph will analyze developments in Russian identity as well will bring final results 
of this thesis necessary to comprehend final conclusions. 
4.4.1 Strengthening of Interethnic Unity 
Interethnic unity plays significant role in promotion and strengthening of identity in 
multiethnic community as Russia definitely is.  
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 In order to strengthen the interethnic and interfaith harmony and unity of the country’s multi-
ethnic society, Vladimir Putin has instructed Dmitry Medvedev to establish Federal Agency 
for Ethnic Affairs on March 2015.155 Except the mentioned, agency should also develop, 
implement and carry-out state and federal targeted programs with respect to interethnic and 
ethno-religious relations. To emphasize the role of multiethnic dimension of Russian identity 
also in history, Deputy Chief Staff of Presidential Executive Office Magomedsalam 
Magomedov noted during seminar on ethnic policy that at the celebration of 70th anniversary 
of Victory in Great Patriotic War it should be highlighted its multiethnic dimension and at the 
same time structural work with youth is relevant for prevention of spread of nationalist 
ideas.156Another agency that was established with regards to promote and carry out the issues 
of minorities or particular ethnics in Russia was Federal Agency for Nationality Affairs. 
Development of mentioned agencies allowed to strengthen efficiency of Russia’s National 
Policy Strategy through to 2025 as well more effective implementation of Russia’s State 
Ethnic Policy Strategy up to 2025 towards the subjects of Russian Federation as well better 
interaction among the particular elements, mainly majority and minority ethnic groups to 
which is mentioned policy aimed. According to this, during the Seminar on implementing of 
ethnic policy in 2015, Vladimir Bulanin (Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the 
Northwestern Federal District) mentioned that system for socio-cultural adaptation for 
migrants and state programs aimed on strengthening of Russian civic identity by maintaining 
of cultural and ethno-cultural development of the peoples of Russia resulted in “noticeable 
drop in interethnic tensions in the federal district.”157 Magomedov added that systematic 
efforts to provide a patriotic education to youth are “preventing manifestations of nationalistic 
ideology that are stimulating Nazi ideas.” Additionally, during meeting of Council for 
Interethnic Relations presidium on September 2015, Magomedov stated by creation of 
Federal Agency for Ethnic Affairs, the state ethnic policy is completed as well that “federal 
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target on program aimed at strengthening the unity of Russian nation and the ethno-cultural 
development of the peoples of Russia is in effect.”158 
Another significant and uniting force of Russian nation presented by administration, and as it 
was presented already is Russian language. With these regards, Putin held a joint meeting of 
Council for Interethnic Relations and Council of Russian Language in order to strengthen 
interaction and coordination of these council’s that are having many overlapping tasks. As the 
conclusion of this meeting it is possible to mention statement of Vladimir Putin  in which he 
expressed that “It is extremely important for preserving of our identity, unity and, so, the 
sovereignty of the Russian state…This means preserving our diversity and maintaining the 
status of Russian language and national languages of the Russian Federation…This is our 
wealth.”159 
To emphasize the importance of strengthening of Russian national unity as the one of crucial 
state’s policies, on April 2016 President Putin decided to establish presidential prize of 2.5 
million rubles annually on the November 4 which is National Unity Day, to those citizens 
which provided productive work for “reinforcing the national, civic identity and spiritual 
common community of Russia’s multiethnic people, harmonize interethnic relations, and 
develop Russia’s ethnic and cultural diversity.”160 
This shows that ethnicity plays important role in Russia’s policy, and also ethnicity as one of 
the elements of identity is proving that construction of Russian identity is taken as important 
measure or agenda for Putin’s administration. Improvements provided in ethnic policy and 
national unity of Russia since Putin’s last presidential term are already showing positive 
results. For example, during the Meeting of the Council for Interethnic Relation in Astrakhan 
in October 2016, Russian President underlined that 80 percent of Russian population 
considers relations between people of different ethnic origin as friendly or normal, while a 
few years ago this number was at 55 percent.161 Putin also noted that formation of Russian 
                                                          
158 Meeting of Council for Interethnic Relations presidium. // Official Internet Resources of the President of 
Russia. URL: http://en.kremlin.ru/catalog/keywords/26/events/page/4 (05.14.2017) 
159 Joint meeting of Council for Interethnic Relations and Council for the Russian Language.// Official Internet 
Resources of the President of Russia. (05.14.2017) 
160 Meeting of the Council for Interethnic Relations Presidium. // Official Internet Resources of the President of 
Russia. (05.14.2017) 
161 Meeting of the Council for Interethnic Relations. // Official Internet Resources of the President of Russia. 
URL: http://en.kremlin.ru/catalog/keywords/26/events/53173 (05.14.2017) 
 82 
 
identity is very complex process that cannot be finished overnight, while the process is for 
sure underway and has been “quite active over recent years.” 
4.4.2 Russian Identity and Foreign Policy 
Paragraphs related to the Ukraine crisis analyzed that Russian identity is influential in foreign 
policy of Russia. The thesis of identity presence in foreign policy of Russia in this case lied in 
conviction that elements as history, ethnicity, language, culture, patriotism or religion are 
influential for Russia’s identity, while they serves as motives to manifest Russia’s interests 
towards the objects where are these elements present, as for official discourse for political 
action. This experience of Russian foreign policy could served as a source of inspiration to 
formation of article of Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, named Russia’s Foreign Policy in a 
Historical Perspective. In his article, Lavrov is analyzing historical parallels towards 
contemporary international affairs in the context that is advocating unique path and legitimate 
part of Russia in development of international relations. Main assumption of historical 
analysis of Minister of Foreign Affairs is that Russia played special role in world history since 
the baptism of Kievan Rus in 988 an throughout the whole process of evolution it played 
unique role in process of cooperation on the one hand, but on the other Russia’s growing 
capacities and power were subjected of the policy of containment or “subjugation of the 
Russian lands by the West and depriving Russians of their identity”162. Lavrov insists that this 
policy is in Russian’s genes, whereas the author made a parallel to contemporary foreign 
policy of Russia that is trying to develop broad substantial cooperation with the West and 
which is searching to solve problems peacefully also by its membership in various 
international organizations for the purpose of “long-term improvement of international 
relations”. Foreign Minister made also kind of parallel to policy of containment from the West 
by stating that Russia is permanently accused of “revisionism” and of attempts of destroying 
current international system. 
Lavrov’s article is making significant reference towards the important events in Russia’s 
history and their role in international relations and its further influence on contemporary 
global politics of Russia. His article can serve to some extent as kind of official agenda for 
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foreign policy of Kremlin, or as Igor Zevelev (2016) noted “it provides an excellent glimpse 
into the framework of current Russian foreign policy, its philosophical foundations and 
general overview of the Russian elite…what matters is that they feel obliged to develop and 
implement their policies in a way that would not contradict the main narrative.”163 
Bearing in mind the role of history in Russia’s identity and Lavrov’s connection to history in 
framing of Russian foreign policy and at the same time assuming the analysis of Ukraine 
crisis and Russia’s foreign policy to it in identity discourse, it is possible to clearly deduce 
that Russian identity is influential for Russia’s foreign policy. Additionally, Zevelev notes 
that “Lavrov started producing his narratives of history and national identity to supplement 
Putin’s ideas…These narratives explained, justified, and motivated Russian foreign policy 
since 2012.”164 
Nevertheless, to sum up it will be essential to mention latest Foreign Policy Concept of the 
Russian Federation (approved by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on 
November 30, 2016) which is one of the fundamental documents of Russian foreign policy. 
According to this document one of the fourteen points of General Provisions is “to strengthen 
Russia’s role in international culture; promote and consolidate the position of the Russian 
language in the world; raise global awareness of Russia’s cultural achievements and national 
historical legacy, cultural identity of the peoples of Russia, and Russian education and 
research; consolidate the Russian-speaking diaspora; Nevertheless, several other objectives 
in this document are concerning terms as history, culture, Russian language, Russian 
Orthodox Church or interethnic and last but not least the term of compatriots, for example as 
one of the objectives of the International Humanitarian Cooperation and Human Rights states 
“to further the consolidation of compatriots living abroad so as to enable them to better 
realize their rights in the countries of residence, and to facilitate the preservation of the 
Russian diaspora’s identity and its ties with the historical homeland, as well as voluntary 
relocation of compatriots to the Russian Federation;”165 
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With respect to mentioned document on foreign policy and compatriots and its relation to 
Russian identity construction in contemporary development, at least two recent amendments 
should be noticed. This is regarded to State Duma approval of a bill on simplified issuance of 
Russian citizenship on March 2017. This amendment “On citizenship of Russian 
Federation”166 and “On legal status of foreign citizens in the Russian Federation” allows 
applying for Russian citizenship to those who was born in “Historical Russian Lands”, 
meaning in Russian Empire or Soviet Union, as well their descendants in a straight line.167 
According to initiator of this bill deputy Konstantin Zatulin, “Those who were driven to leave 
the country by the “will” of history at the beginning of century, or those who were “left” by 
the state after dissolution of USSR, should be recognized as citizens of Russian Federation, 
regardless of whether they want to move to the country or not. Among the opponents of this 
bill are mainly western oriented commentators which are stating that similar distribution of 
Russian passports was also in Abkhazia and South Ossetia what further led into war with 
Georgia, while in this case situation can appear in southeastern Ukraine, thus it can be used as 
pretext for annexation of other countries.168  
Second important amendment issued recently on April 2017 with regards to compatriots is 
connected to one mentioned above. Zatulin mentioned during his comments to the proposed 
law that “it would be fair that those applicants for Russian citizenship do not lose their current 
citizenship. According to this, Sergey Mironov proposed amendment on Russian citizenship 
for Russian speaker without losing their current citizenship, aimed mainly on Ukrainians.169 
However, these amendments are beyond the research period of this dissertation, but in fact 
they can serve for illustrational purposes of that, that Russian identity, or identity in general is 
process of constant construction due to global changes in international environment. But 
nevertheless, these assumptions have showed that Russian identity construction continues in 
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same trend since the period in which started its research in this paper, what is strengthening 
the answer for the research question whether Russian identity is strong enough for consistent 
foreign policy. Notwithstanding the assumption of constant change of identity and its 
understanding as a process with regards to constructivist’s opinion, its determinant elements 
or components towards which is particular identity orienting are remaining the same, and so 
much to primordial theory. 
Conclusion 
     This thesis has analyzed the dynamic of identity construction in the period of 2010-2016. 
Starting with the theoretical explanations of the term of identity in theories of constructivism 
and primordialism, research did framework of analyzed object for the purpose of 
understanding under what characteristics is identity in this paper understood. Intend of 
choosing constructivist and primordial theories lied in fact to find a “breakthrough” between 
these theories which contradict each other in basic opinion on identity and further to prove 
that such “breakthrough” is applicable in practice.  
While the constructivism admits that identity is changing due to interactions with the other 
social actors, primordialism states that identity is fixed, given and undeniable. However 
analysis has shown that both of these theories are applicable, but regarding to fact of their 
final statements and contradictions whether identity is changeable or not, this research has 
proved that “compromise” between these two approaches should be found. This first outcome 
of thesis was achieved by elaboration of historical perspective on Russian identity which has 
identified specific elements or components through the evolution of identity in Russia since 
the 18th century up to the beginning of researched period that is since Medvedev’s presidency 
and the year 2010 respectively. Historical evolution has pointed out that Russian identity was 
changing for example with regards to debate between Westernizers and Slavophiles and 
further on conceptions of Eurasian identity before and during the USSR or liberal western or 
uncertain one after the collapse of the Soviet Union. At this point, constructivist theory on 
changing of identity is absolutely correct. However, this historical analysis has identified also 
few elements that were present in different concepts on Russian identity during different 
periods of time and these elements are still persistent or better say are influential in Russian 
identity also in contemporary. Components of Orthodox Church, unique path or historical role 
of Russia and various elements stemming from it like its historical lands, unifying 
components of different ethnics and religions or Russia’s history in general were present in 
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conception of Russian identity in history and as it was presented, they are influential in 
contemporary as well. Assuming this, the primordial opinion on identity that it is fixed or 
somehow given is also correct. The prove of “breakthrough” between the two theories on 
identity stipulates the opinion that the academic attention towards the research on identity 
should continue also in other perspectives that are already elaborated and also that identity 
discourse in social science, namely in international relations is important what is extended in 
other findings of this research. 
Second finding of this dissertation points on its research question, respectively to its answer 
whether is Russian identity strong enough for consistent foreign policy (?). The literature 
review on topic of Russian identity has presented the discourse on this topic among the 
various authors, with different background and distinctive approach for their findings. 
However, their different point of views has found at least one common conclusion among the 
majority of authors, and that is that concept of Russian identity is uncertain and weak. This 
conclusion of theirs is certainly dependent on assumption towards which and who’s 
component of international relations or politics they were its conclusion constructing. 
Nevertheless, literature review has analyzed why Russian identity was at certain period weak, 
and what led the Russian officials to indulge this topic. Another purpose of such different 
opinions in literature review was to prove how plenteous discourse on Russian identity is and 
how differently can be identity examined. 
Nonetheless, to challenge the crisis in Russian identity discourse and whether that crisis was 
(is) still present, and how did Russian administration dealt with this issue appears like a 
motive for research question-if Russian identity is strong enough for consistent foreign policy. 
To identify findings on this question this research has analyzed mainly presidential 
statements, amendments and speeches, as well other governmental documents that were 
issued or submitted by president Dmitry Medvedev since 2008 in broad discourse on Russian 
identity, but more specifically since 2010 when he publicly announced that attention on the 
topic of  Russian identity in politics is essential. Since then, Russian administration started to 
work on (re)construction of identity mainly in symbolical decisions in order to develop the 
domestic social status and to promote the country’s interests and position towards identity 
mainly at home. Significant progress or shift in Russian identity construction occurred during 
third presidential term of Vladimir Putin in 2012. Putin has presented specific policy strategy 
that was regarded to identity construction and that was not only symbolic but had effect in 
various domestic policies. His administration did various effective amendments and laws that 
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were influential for construction and promotion of Russian identity not only in domestic terms 
but also had effect in abroad. Putin’s administration was faced with the foreign policy with 
regards to situation in Ukraine, where has construction of Russian identity subjected to first 
international or foreign test. In the beginning and also during continuation of this test, Russian 
identity is holding same position with reference to the status quo in Ukraine; furthermore 
framework of policy towards Russia’s identity presented and gradually developed by Putin is 
influential for Russia’s foreign policy also in recent developments with regards to 
amendments on Russian citizenship and compatriots. With results of such analysis, it is 
possible to prove that Russian identity is strong enough for consistent foreign policy, as for 
the second finding of this dissertation. 
Third finding of this dissertation is regarded to complementary research question on how is 
the conflict between the Russia and the West perceived through the dynamic of Russian 
identity construction (?). For the purpose of finding of answer for this question, it was 
necessary to provide a research of Russia’s foreign policy in terms of Russian identity and its 
further discourse on statements or actions provided by the representatives of the West. In 
order to obtain the results of perception of conflict between the Russia and the West, this 
research has analyzed the Russia’s foreign policy to Ukraine crisis and Crimea respectively. 
As the Kremlin’s particular action and position towards the Ukraine and Crimea was led by 
the Russian identity discourse as the main (official) generator of this conflict in opinions 
between the Russia and West, and further action of the representatives of West towards 
Russia in the meaning of sanctions, the answer on this complementary question is evident. 
The conflict between the Russia and the West through the dynamic of Russian identity 
construction also in the context of recent developments in the Russian citizenship whereas 
mainly western representatives are blaming Russia from “revisionism” and pretexts for 
annexations, while the Russian side states that it is only trying to preserve its identity in 
context of “Russian lands”, compatriots or “historical injustice” and that Russia have  right to 
defend its people and interests as every other nation. Furthermore, this conflict can be 
perceived also in the discourse of conflict between the identities of particular actors. On the 
one side is Russian with its conviction of unique historical role, moral values and other 
mentioned components of its identity, while on the other stand the West with its components 
as democracy, liberalism, justice, human rights and so on and in addition, in the middle of this 
conflict is Ukraine with its uncertain identity. According to the split of country’s citizens 
about the framework of political system, ideology, languages and foreign policy, country is 
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struggling in its search of identity between the Russia and the West on the one hand, and is 
also struggling to find or construct its own identity on the other.  
Finally, this dissertation has proved that identity is important feature or phenomenon in foreign 
policy and international relations in general. It has validated that study of identity as a social 
behavior of particular actor is useful in assessing action towards that actor as well interaction of 
certain actor towards the others.  Analysis of actor’s identity in international relations can be helpful 
in prediction of outcomes, costs and benefits that can be achieved by performing of specific action 
towards specific state, or other subjects of reference in international relations. With regards to 
assumption whether this thesis can find any “collaboration” with other analysis in Russian identity 
discourse with similar outcomes on Russian identity, thus to support or strengthen the findings of 
this thesis, it is possible to conclude that outcomes of Igor Zevelev (2016) are similar with respect 
to his identification of “big ideas” adopted from Russian intellectual history as “exceptionalism, 
special spiritual and civilizational mission and portrait of West as evil” played role through the 
evolution of Russian identity and are still influential in Russia’s foreign policy and identity as well. 
Consistency of Russian identity analyzed on recent events suggested that this social behavior of 
Russian Federation is relatively stable. From this perspective it is possible to predict potential 
insights for Russian behavior regarding to identity in future and also to indicate the interests of 
Russian foreign policy as well Russia’s interaction towards specific issues that are concerning 
analyzed components of Russian identity. However, on each of those components can be written 
extensive research, this thesis at least have analyzed them what can be useful before realizing 
specific action and making particular decision. 
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